otherwise 4.oth.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

It's hard to imagine a family doctor who is more interested in the family's pretty teenaged girls rather than the health of his patients, but Josephakis Charalambous was just that. This was not an isolated incident, but a way of life for this most decadent of physicians.

A Canadian citizen, he had been born in 1952 of Greek parentage on the island of Cyprus, but had immigrated to Canada at the age of eight with his parents and siblings and settled in Vancouver, British Columbia. According to John Griffiths in Fatal Prescription, his father was a harsh man who was hated and disrespected by his family and who was eventually estranged from his wife and children.

Fatal Prescription by John Griffiths
Fatal Prescription by John Griffiths

Charalambous was indulged by his mother, who did everything she could to help him complete his medical education. Despite what appears to be a reasonably good relationship with his mother and sister, Charalambous had a very negative view of women. They were trash from his point of view: objects to be seduced and then discarded.

His desire to dominate and control women began early in his life and characterized his behavior in high school and university. Intimately tied into his desire to become a physician was his need to be able to attract desirable women with his professional status. However, his medical degree, once attained, was not the automatic magnet that he had hoped for. Women were not flocking to him and he often used prostitutes to satisfy his sexual requirements.

Things started to go seriously off track at age 33 when in 1985 he became obsessed with a 15-year-old girl, Shelley Joel, who was a patient of his, as were the other members of her family. Very much against the wishes of her parents, Charalambous pushed himself on the young woman and alienated her from her family.

Griffiths suggests that Charalambous married Shelley a couple of years later to avoid censure from the College of Physicians and Surgeons in Canada. All the time, the brainwashed Shelley was physically and mentally abused by him. And if that was not bad enough, he cheated on her with prostitutes. But that was nothing compared to his next move.

Sian Simmonds
Sian Simmonds

He had set out to conquer two young female patients Sian (pronounced Shawn) and Katie Simmonds. The girls complained to their father that the doctor had crossed the boundary of professionalism with his attentions. In 1991, their father went right to the College of Physicians and Surgeons with his concerns and the girls' formal complaints were lodged.

The subsequent trial transcripts stated: "It wasn't until November of 1992, that Charalambous was told that hearings into the girls' complaints would be held in March of 1993. On the morning of January 27, 1993, between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, Sian Simmonds was killed in her basement suite in Surrey, B.C. She was shot twice and then beaten on the head numerous times with a blunt object. David Walter Schlender confessed to the killing in exchange for police protection for his family. He entered a plea of guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty years. The theory of the Canadian prosecutors was that Charalambous hired Brian West to arrange the murder of Sian Simmonds in order to prevent her from testifying against him at the College hearing, and that West had then hired Schlender to carry out the murder.

"David Schlender was a drug user and owed money to Brian West. West told Schlender that Simmonds and her sister had to be killed to prevent them from testifying against a karate instructor friend. Charalambous was a karate instructor. West threatened Schlender and his family several times. Schlender agreed to kill Simmonds and her sister. West provided Schlender with a handgun, silencer, and bullets. West then narrowed his instructions to include only the blonde girl that drove the red jeep and lived at the Simmonds' house.

"On 27 January 1993, after drinking beer and smoking cocaine with a friend named Brian Cann, Schlender drove alone in Cann's car to Simmonds' house. He then returned home and smoked cocaine with his wife. Finally Schlender went back to Simmonds' house armed with a gun. Once at the house, he scratched the door of her jeep with a key. Schlender went to the front door of the house and spoke to the upstairs resident who directed Schlender to the basement. He spoke to Sian Simmonds, telling her that he had accidentally scratched her jeep. She went outside with Schlender to examine the jeep and then the two returned to the residence. Schlender gave Simmonds Cann's insurance documents and went into the bathroom. Schlender emerged from the bathroom with the gun. He approached Simmonds who was sitting at the table and held the gun to the back of her head. Simmonds saw the gun and panicked. Schlender shot her and then beat her to death with the gun."

Clearly, the testimony of Schlender was very damaging to the doctor, but his wife Shelley did quite a bit on her own. Charalambous had told her too many details about the murder that she could not have known otherwise. When she testified about these details that her husband had admitted to her, it carried tremendous weight with the jury.

Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire was found guilty of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility of parole until 25 years of the sentence had been served.

On May 13, 1997 Josephakis Charalambous' appeal was dismissed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

survive 2.sur.002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Early in 1986, on January 3, the next stabbing victim was found. Anna Carroll, 68, lived in another Philadelphia neighborhood, on the 1400 block of Ritner Street. The door to her apartment was standing open on that cold winter day, and she was found lying on the floor of the bedroom. As Newton notes, she was nude from the waist down, and she had been stabbed only six times in the back, with one gaping postmortem wound going from breastbone to groin, as if the killer intended to gut the body. A kitchen knife had been left in her.

While this scene was ten miles from where Helen Patent had been found, the brief time that had elapsed between the incidents and the similarity of the condition of the bodies, as well as the incidents' timing — both had occurred during the night —made authorities consider the possibility of a predator common to both victims. But they did not actively investigate them as such.

Anna Carroll, too, had been seen in Frankford's area bars, as noted in the Philadelphia Inquirer, as had the next victim, who turned up murdered nearly a year later, on Christmas Day, when neighbors found her door open. In fact, all three had been seen at "Goldie's," as the Golden Bar was known, situated at the 5200 block on Frankford Avenue. It was near the elevated train terminal. Susan Olszef, 64, was also found in her apartment and had also been stabbed six times in the back. She lived on Richmond Street, which was closer to the scene of the first murder by seven miles.

The 5200 block of Frankford Street, "Goldies" Bar
The 5200 block of Frankford Street, "Goldies" Bar

Frankford began as a town older even than Philadelphia, writes Linda Loyd in the Inquirer, and was famous as the winter headquarters for traveling circuses. The neighborhood supported a symphony orchestra and a football team, which eventually became the Philadelphia Eagles. The El (elevated train) arrived in 1922, bringing prosperity and industry as the larger city subsumed the town, but by 1980, the place was a crime-ridden slum populated by prostitutes, junkies, and independent businesses struggling to survive. Newton mentions that Sylvester Stallone selected this rundown area as a setting for his film, Rocky. Frankford Avenue, once known as the King's Highway, comprised a 13-block strip of diverse storefronts that sat in the El's shadow. Commuters disembarked at the busy station but scattered quickly to their homes.

Among the problems that hindered the murder investigation was the fact that many people were drawn to the Frankford Street area because of its nightlife. One can grab a doughnut or newspaper, or buy a drink at any time, and that made it a busy area. An anonymous murder could be committed easily. Another problem was that the police did not yet accept the three murders were linked, because they had occurred in different areas of the city. They had no hard leads after three killings, but they were about to get another nasty surprise.

By 7:30 A.M. on January 8, 1987, the fourth victim had turned up. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Ambassador Tatekawa's request 6.atr.0002 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

161. Foreign Minister Matsuoka Resigns (July 18, 1941).



Japan's announcement of its neutrality in regard to the German-Russian war did not dispose of a critical internal situation at home. On July 16, 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka con-



[623] II, Ibid.

[624] II, 587.

[625] II, 588.

[626] II, 589.

[626a] II, 590.

[626b] II, 591.



128



fided in Ambassador Oshima that Japan's situation had looked so impossible when he had taken office that he had felt that nothing on earth could have saved it. However, it had always been his policy to attempt everything within his power to effect a solution. Nevertheless, Japan was now in a terrible predicament and Mr. Matsuoka was experiencing many tribulations. [626c] Some hint of what caused Mr. Matsuoka's anxiety was discerned on July 18, 1941 when, after a meeting of the Japanese Cabinet, Mr. Matsuoka was replaced by Admiral Teijiro Toyoda as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Ambassador Horikiri in Rome pointed out that genuine sympathy was felt in Italy for Mr. Matsuoka, because he had succeeded in bringing about a union of the three Axis countries. Most Italians now believed that the status quo could not be maintained in the light of the Japanese change, but Japan emphasized that the shift in its Cabinet signified only the strengthening of popular unity, and would not impair its allegiance to the Tripartite Pact. [626d] According to Ambassador Horikiri, Japan's unshakable determination made a favorable impression upon authorities in Rome, who, nevertheless, continued to watch Japan's actions. [626e]

On July 24, 1941 in a message to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop of Germany and on July 25, 1941 in a formal statement to Foreign Minister Ciano of Italy, Mr. Matsuoka reiterated Japan's intentions to remain true to its foreign policy, and expressed his appreciation for the kindness shown to him during his term of office. [626f]



162. Japan Retaliates Against the American Freezing Order.



The meeting of the Japanese Cabinet on July 27, 1941 decided upon retaliatory measures against the United States for freezing Japanese assets. Japan decided to draw up certain measures which would control foreign exchange and would entail all business activities of American citizens. However, if the United States were to act leniently in the future, Japanese authorities in Japan, Manchukuo, and China would be prepared to do likewise. [626g]



163. Ambassador Oshima Attempts to Change Japan's Policy.



Ambassador Oshima had continued his efforts to persuade Japanese authorities to support Germany in the war against Russia and to cease their negotiations with the United States. On July 17, 1941 he reported the displeasure of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Chancellor Hitler with Japan's recent activities, and urged that Japan make the Tripartite Pact the foundation of its national policy. [626h]

Two weeks later, on July 31, 1941, he again disagreed with Tokyo's interpretation of Germany's motives in attacking Russia by pointing out that Germany was planning only a short war in Russia before attacking England. Ambassador Oshima anticipated the collapse of Commissar Stalin's government in the near future, and though admitting that America would enter the war, he minimized its ability to aid England. [626i]



[626c] II, 592.

[626d] II, 593-595.

[626e] II, 595.

[626f] II, 596-597.

[626g] II, 598.

[626h] II, 599.

[626i] II, 600.



129



C—JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD



(f) Japanese-Russian Relations.



164. Rumor of Russia Withdrawing Its Troops from German Borders (May 1941).



Immediately following the Hess incident, relations between Moscow and Berlin began to show definite signs of strain, and Japan's alliance with Germany and its Neutrality Pact with Russia placed it in a delicate position. Although Russia had been faithfully carrying out its economic agreements with Germany, it was noted in Berlin, as early as May 14, 1941, that Russia had withdrawn its troops from the German border, either in anticipation of war or with the purpose of avoiding it. Meanwhile, the German army continued its preparations, confident that it could easily conquer European Russia, if such were Chancellor Hitler's plan. [627]



165. Russia Restricts the Transportation of War Materials.



In the economic agreement of September 1939, Russia had invited Germany to transport goods through Russia, but in May 1941 a problem concerning war materials arose. [628] Russia began restricting the shipment of machine tools and other war machinery for making arms, bombs and planes, and though Japan's representatives commenced negotiations to have some of these restrictions relaxed, a negative response was expected. [629] Nor would Russia accept for transit goods assigned to countries with which it had not reached an agreement. To overcome this disadvantage, Tokyo ordered, in mid-May 1941 that freight which was to be shipped to Japan through either free or occupied territory was to be paid for in free German marks. [630]

Both Germany and Japan were disturbed because the worsening of German-Russian relations would eliminate the passage of import goods from Germany via Siberia. [631] Because of this the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on June 18, 1941 forwarded to Tokyo the German suggestion that Japan add to the terms of the recently contracted Japan-Russian trade pact certain provisions which would make possible the transfer of goods through Russian territory to and from other countries, including unoccupied countries. [632]

On the other hand, Tokyo was informed on June 17, 1941 that courier service could be reopened between Manchukuo and Europe, which indicated some relaxation of restrictions. [633]



166. Russia Seeks to Avoid War with Germany.



On May 15, 1941 Ambassador Tatekawa requested an explanation from Foreign Minister Molotov regarding the current rumors of war between Russia and Germany, and pointed out that, if such rumors were true, Japan would act only as mediator. Foreign Minister Molotov assured him that such talk was entirely without foundation and was designed only to discredit the Tripartite Pact. As a result of this interview, the Japanese Ambassador believed that Russia was attempting to avoid a clash with Germany, and that intensive Russian defense preparations along the western border were inconsequential in view of Russia's desire to avert war.



[627] II, 601.

[628] II, 602.

[629] II, 603.

[630] II, 604-605.

[631] II, 606.

[632] II, 607.

[633] II, 608.

[634] II, 609.



130



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



According to a report of Ambassador Tatekawa on May 16, 1941 Germany had some 140 to 150 divisions concentrated on the western border with reinforcements close at hand, and Russia had but 116 divisions. [635] With this in mind, and considering the fact that Russian forces had long feared the German army, the Japanese Ambassador felt that there was no possibility of a clash because of Russian weakness.

Ambassador Tatekawa also pointed to the disadvantages of war for Germany, inasmuch as it was receiving the natural resources it needed from Russia. He believed that Germany could take the Ukraine, but that by fighting a defensive war Russia could nullify Germany's temporary gains. For all of these reasons, the Japanese Ambassador to Moscow stated that he did not see in the near future any chance of a major war developing between Germany and Russia. [636]

Vatican sources added strength to this belief in peace when they reported to Ambassador Horikiri that Russia had no alternative but to align itself with the Axis. [637]

Furthermore, though German intentions were not clear to Ambassador Oshima in Berlin, he felt that Russia would refrain from mobilization in the hopes of not giving Germany an excuse for an attack. However, he indicated his belief that Germany would defeat Russia in a short time, and that the United States and England would be of little assistance to Russia. [638]



167. European Observers Predict a German-Russian War.



Signs of a coming clash between Russia and Germany were perceived by some European observers, for on May 30, 1941 an eminent correspondent of the Catholic press confided to the Japanese Ambassador at Rome that German-Russian relations had reached "a pass of extreme tension", and another well-informed newspaperman predicted that hostilities with Russia would start about June 15, 1941. Many observers believed that Germany would delay an attack against England and would immediately enter into hostilities against Russia, which was then expected to seek conciliation. [639]

War rumors were also prevalent in the Balkans where northbound German troops and supply cars were noticed. It was reported on June 3, 1941 that certain diplomatic circles in Sofia would welcome an outbreak of war because such a conflict would lead to the overthrow of the Communist Party. It appeared that Russian influence had been completely swept out of Yugoslavia, although Serb and Croatian sympathy for the Slavs was still as strong as ever. [640]



168. Japanese-Russian Trade Agreement (June 9, 1941).



Both Japan and Russia were striving to attain an equitable solution in regard to fishing and trade agreements, and Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow urged, on May 15, 1941 that Japan act not later than August, 1941 on the question of North Sakhalin, an island owned jointly by Russia and Japan. [641]

Foreign Minister Matsuoka replied, on May 28, 1941, that he intended to settle definitely the question of rights and interests in North Sakhalin within the coming year. He asked that Russia have confidence in him, since in conducting the commerce and fishery negotiations satisfactorily he expected to encounter some domestic opposition.



[635] II, 610.

[636] II, 611.

[637] II, 612.

[638] II, 613.

[639] II, 614.

[640] II, 615.

[641] II, 616.



131



Although Japan had decided to maintain its usual defenses in the North Seas, it issued special instructions, on May 28, 1941, to its subjects forbidding trespassing or any acts of a troublesome nature within Russian waters. [642] Some contention arose over the scheduled departure on June 15, 1941 of the Kaiyo Maru for Sakhalin Island, but Tokyo decided to send it, regardless of the attitude of Russia. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire [643]

On May 31, 1941 Ambassador Tatekawa presented the respects of his Foreign Minister to Mr. Molotov, who, having already expressed his desire for an immediate completion of negotiations, urged the Japanese Ambassador to expedite matters in Tokyo. Thereupon Ambassador Tatekawa pointed out to Mr. Matsuoka that although the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact with Russia had been generally accepted in Japan, an early settlement of the fisheries dispute would effectively silence the remaining opposition by demonstrating Russian sincerity in the negotiations.

It was evident that Moscow blamed Mr. Matsuoka for the delay, since on May 15, 1941 Mr. Molotov had drawn up and delivered the Russian statement regarding the fisheries question, and, as of June 1, 1941 no answer had been received from Tokyo. [644]

According to Mr. Molotov, only one problem impeded the final settlement which Ambassador Tatekawa hoped for within a week after June 1, 1941. This was the Russian demand that the differential between land and sea shipping expenses be made up for by payment in kind of Japanese commodities. The Japanese Ambassador on June 1, 1941 offered his opinion, in which Mr. Molotov concurred, that some formula for mutual agreement on the matter could be reached. Having submitted a revised proposal to the Russian; the Japanese Ambassador stated that the entire business would be concluded with a week. [645] After much discussion of details to be included in the document, the agreement was finally reached on June 9, 1941. [646]



169. Japanese-Russian Agreement as to Boundary Lines (June 10, 1941).



In an effort to protect Japanese-Russian relations and to support the recently signed neutrality pact, a conference had been opened at Chita on May 27, 1941 to discuss the Manchurian-Russian boarder delineation. Even though the Japanese army was of the opinion that the whole matter should be kept absolutely secret, Japanese diplomats decided to make a public statement concerning the agreement finally reached on June 10, 1941, since it was believed that such an announcement would further the already improved relations between the two countries. [647] Though the preliminary work had been finished, the actual demarcation of the line remained to be done. It was hoped that this could be accomplished by the end of the summer of 1941. [648]

On the same day that Japan and Russia concluded their agreement, a report, sent to Tokyo and Moscow from Hsinking, Manchoukuo, declared that twenty-seven armored trains were transporting 800 trucks between Chita and Manchuli. Japanese diplomats traveling through Russia always made detailed reports of the military activities they had observed en route. [649]



[642] II, 617.

[643] II, 618.

[644] II, 619.

[645] II, 620-621.

[646] II, 622-624.

[647] II, 625-626.

[648] II, 627-628.

[649] II, 629.



132



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



It was pointed out that even for maneuvers, this was a large number of trucks, and in view of the international situation such activity deserved Japan's close attention. [650]

Russia agreed to Tokyo's request of June 16, 1941 that secrecy be observed regarding three diplomatic notes, which were to be known only to the Japanese Foreign Office and such officials as Russia approved. [651] Meanwhile, Japan was suspicious of Russia, and even on special occasions it insisted that Russian visitors be furnished with Japanese transportation. [652]



170. Russia Supplies Essential Materials to Germany.



From a commercial viewpoint, Russian-German relations in May and early June 1941 appeared unruffled for despite its overtaxed railroad facilities and recent loss of influence in the Balkans, [653] Russia continued to supply Germany with large quantities of materials even though, according to the Russian First Secretary at Rome no agreement regarding the joint exploitation of the Ukraine was in existence. [654] Furthermore, Tokyo was informed on June 5, 1941 that new contracts for raw materials between Russia and Italy were being considered, and that an Italian economic mission to Moscow was being organized. [655]



171. Germany's Demands on Russia.



On June 6, 1941 Japanese representatives in Sofia and Moscow reported that the following demands were to be made of Russia by Germany:



(1) Return part of Bukovina to Rumania,

(2) Reconsider the Russian-German border line in Galicia,

(3) Allow Germany to enter the Ukraine, and

(4) Permit her passage through the Caucasus.



The fact that Germany had not referred to Bessarabia in her demands was interpreted by Japanese spokesman as something of a compromise. [656] Mr. Izumi, a Japanese representative in Sofia, stated that the acceptance of these demands would shatter the Russian army's prestige, and he expected that the anti-Stalin wing would stage a coup d'etat. According to Mr. Izumi, it appeared that Russia was now forced to acquiesce or fight, and he believed that Russia was seriously menaced both from within and from without. Although there was still a possibility for peace, the German army was pressing Herr von Ribbentrop for a showdown, since it expected to defeat the Russian army in two or three weeks. [657] Some in diplomatic circles contended that Hitler was merely trying, at the risk of war, to bring Russia into the Tripartite Alliance. [658]



172. Japanese Diplomats Urge Russia to Accept German Demands.



Both Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow on June 7, 1941 and Ambassador Horikiri in Rome on June 14, 1941 urged Mr. Matsuoka to intervene in bringing peace between Russia and Ger-



[650] II, 630.

[651] II, 631-632.

[652] II, 633.

[653] II, 610.

[654] II, 634.

[655] II, 635.

[656] II, 636.

[657] II, 637.

[658] II, 638.



133



many. The Foreign Minister was advised to press Russia to join the Axis, or to collaborate closely with anti-British and anti-American groups. Whatever the demands, Japan felt that Russia should accept in order to avoid war. [659]

Ambassador Tatekawa reported on June 7, 1941 that the German Ambassador in Moscow believed that Russia had acceded in the main to Germany's requests, and that there was no reason for an attack. [660] But on June 17, 1941 the Japanese consul at Ankara was informed by a member of the German Embassy that unless Russia conformed to Chancellor Hitler's demands within the next ten days, hostilities would begin. [661]



173. German Leaders Warn Japan of the Coming War.



On June 4, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported the details of some important interviews he had just held with Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Chancellor Hitler in which both German leaders had agreed that in all probability Germany could not avoid war with Russia. [662] Though the war was not yet a certainty and the date had not yet been set, Herr von Ribbentrop advised Japan to make its preparations for the event as soon as possible. According to the German leader, the campaign would be successfully finished in three months. [663]

Although there were many rumors to the effect that negotiations were under way between Russia and Germany, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop had dismissed them as being absolutely groundless. Moreover, he declared that Germany had completed all its preparations and that troop concentrations were massed along its eastern border where Russian troops had also been stationed.

Ambassador Oshima asked Herr von Ribbentrop whether or not war with Russia could be avoided since Germany's main objective was England. The German Foreign Minister replied that the attitude of the Soviet Union of late had become increasingly unfriendly toward Germany, and that there had even been an armed border clash between the two forces at the mouth of the Danube. According to the German Foreign Minister, it was evident that Russia was merely waiting for Germany to fail against England before declaring war itself.

Herr von Ribbentrop advised the Japanese Ambassador that the conquest of Russia at this time would give complete and undisputable control of the entire European continent to Germany, and would make it absolutely impossible for Great Britain and the United States to touch it. Moreover, such a conquest would split Russia to the great advantage of Japan. [664]

Ambassador Oshima advised Tokyo on June 6, 1941 to prevent the departure of Japanese citizens for Europe, via Siberia, because of the threatening situation, and a few days later the German Ambassador in Tokyo was ordered to keep Germans away from this route. [665]



174. Germany Denies Negotiating with Russia.



Despite the denials of Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop in his talks with Ambassador Oshima on June 3, 4, 1941 that Germany was negotiating with Russia, Tokyo, on June 14, 1941, ordered both Ambassador Horikiri in Rome and Ambassador Oshima in Berlin to inquire once again concerning this matter. [666]



[659] II, 639-640.

[660] II, 641.

[661] II, 642.

[662] II, 643-644.

[663] II, 646.

[664] II, Ibid.

[665] II, 647-648.

[666] II, 649-650.



143



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



Mr. Matsuoka's curiosity concerning a German-Russian rapprochement was again manifested on June 20, 1941, when he ordered Ambassador Oshima to discuss the gist of a reported conversation between the German Foreign Minister and the Russian Ambassador in Berlin. [667] Herr von Ribbentrop promptly denied that he had conversed with Ambassador Deganov, and reiterated that Germany had no intentions of negotiating with Russia. [668]



175. Prospects of an Anglo-Russian Oil Agreement.



Ambassador Cripps' mission to Moscow, according to a report to Tokyo from the Japanese Ambassador in London on June 13, 1941, had not materially improved Anglo-Russian relations though England had already become aware of the inevitability of the Russo-German conflict. The Japanese Ambassador in London believed that as a consequence, an Asiatic-European rapprochement, at least on Anglo-Russian oil, would evolve. [669]



176. Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow Doubts the Possibility of a German-Russian War. (June 16, 1941).



Italian and German Ambassadors in Moscow conferred on June 15, 1941 concerning the evacuation of their diplomatic staffs and families, and though the Japanese diplomats were informed that no official word had been received from either Berlin or Rome, arrangements for the departure of female staff members were concluded. As to the causes for this move, Mr. Tatekawa was informed that all departures were for family reasons. [670] The Japanese Ambassador was inclined to believe that the Axis diplomats had received no official instructions for he could discover no signs of their burning their codes or taking any other final precautions. [671]

The Japanese Ambassador to Moscow was still convinced on June 16, 1941 that Russia, although encouraged by England and the United States, knew full well that it had to maintain a cooperative attitude toward Germany. Ambassador Tatekawa blamed British Ambassador Cripps for an unfounded rumor of war between Russia and Germany, which had been denied by Tass, the official Russian news agency. [672]

However, Tokyo announced on June 17, 1941 that British and Russian denials of the threatening German-Russian rupture were made to minimize the situation, and should be considered as mere propaganda. Significantly, the Japanese government expected the beginning of the Russian war to be followed by a British-Russian alliance, an American-Russian rapprochement, and, finally, the entrance of the United States into the war. [673]



177. Ambassador Oshima Warns of the Imminence of the Russian-German War.



According to Ambassador Oshima, preparations had already been completed for the German surprise attack, and the Rumanian army had been completely mobilized on June 13, 1941. Chancellor Hitler had returned to Berlin on June 14, 1941 while Generals Brauchitsch and Halder as well as other military leaders had already gone to the front line. In view of these facts, Ambassador Oshima urgently requested instructions as to Japan's policy towards the war. [674]



[667] II, 651.

[668] II, 652.

[669] II, 653.

[670] II, 654-655.

[671] II, 656.

[672] II, 657.

[673] II, 658.

[674] II, 659.



135



On June 18, 1941 Ambassador Oshima reported that the clearing of the weather in Germany and the fact that Russia was fully aware of Germany's intentions made the outbreak of war likely at any time. He emphasized the German army's assurance of annihilating the Russian army in four weeks, and urged that Japan should be well prepared for the ending of the war in the near future. [675]



178. Japanese-Russian Financial Relations Remain Stable.



Japan continued to carry on normal financial relations with Russia, and, on June 20, 1941 after America's freezing of German and Italian capital, it made preparations to transfer American money remittances directly from Tokyo to Moscow, rather than through Berlin. [676]



179. Japan Denies Its Friendly Relations with Russia Have Inconvenienced Germany.



Herr von Ribbentrop intimated on June 21, 1941 that Japan was responsible for Russia's ability to move its Far Eastern forces to European Russia, whereupon Ambassador Oshima pointed out to the German Foreign Minister that it was only natural for Russia to concentrate its troops in its most vital possessions, and that Japanese-Russian relations had nothing to do with this move. [677]



180. Germany Attacks Russia (June 22, 1941).



Germany attacked Russia at 4 A.M., Moscow time, on June 22, 1941, just one hour before the German Ambassador to Moscow presented to Mr. Molotov a note he had received from Berlin on the previous evening.

Not all members of the German Foreign Staff whole-heartedly supported the attack, for the German Ambassador to Moscow, meeting with Ambassador Tatekawa, expressed his distinct disapproval. He had known since April 17, 1941 that Germany was going to attack Russia, and he believed that there was no reason for it to do so since Russia had not been deliberately obstructing Germany's military action. He concluded that powerful military leaders must have been guiding Chancellor Hitler. [678]

After the outbreak of hostilities, the German Consul General met with Ambassador Ota at Vladivostok on the afternoon of June 22, 1941 and he explained that since the Comintern had been engaging for many months in activities within Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, as well as other countries coming under the jurisdiction of the Third Reich, and had also refused to withdraw its troops from the border (See Japanese-Russian Relations, Section 164), Russia had actually precipitated the final breach in German-Russian relations.

The Axis representative continued by saying that the war had been started by Germany, and that he saw no reason why Japan, for the present, should not maintain neutrality. The German diplomat's request that German nationals be cared for in Japan and in Manchuria was granted, but when Mr. Ota offered to safeguard the documents of the departing diplomat, he learned that all German codes and important documents had been burned the night before. [679]



[675] II, 660.

[676] II, 661.

[677] II, 662.

[678] II, 663.

[679] II, 665.



136



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



Reports on the first day's fighting divulged that Russian troops along the border had not been completely mobilized. Five hundred Russian planes were reported shot down or destroyed on the ground, and a Russian air raid on Tilsit did little damage. Twenty-five Roumanian divisions under Marshal Antonescu and fifteen divisions under Marshal Karl Gustaf Mannerheim were assisting the Germans. According to Ambassador Oshima, the success of the day's fighting contributed to the Axis' great confidence in the ultimate outcome of the conflict. [680]

Although it was accepted that Germany would destroy the Ukraine and Caucasus, Ambassador Ota, talking with the U.S. Consul General in Vladivostok, learned that not all observers were agreed that Germany would pierce the heart of Russia. [681] Stating that he was convinced that President Roosevelt would announce America's participation in the war and the extension of military assistance to Russia, the American representative expressed the hope that Japan, which was in a unique position, would move with caution. [682]



181. Japan Assures Germany of Its Support of the Axis.



On that same eventful day, June 22, 1941, Ambassador Ott called at the Japanese Foreign Office in Tokyo to show the text of the German note which had been delivered to Russia, and to announce that Hitler planned to "use every might and means to march against the U.S.S.R." In response to an inquiry from Mr. Matsuoka, the German Ambassador admitted that there was no declaration of war against Russia in the note. Two days later June 24, 1941, it had been decided that no move in regard to the German-Russian war would be taken without full consultation with the German government. Japan again reiterated its desire to act entirely in accordance with the Tripartite Pact and stated that in regard to Poland, it would not quibble over details. [683]

It had been agreed that German officials in Moscow would be taken to Iran, and German interests would be placed in charge of the Bulgarian Minister. At Vladivostok, the German Consul General had severed all connections with the outside world on June 25, 1941, and arrangements were being made for him to embark on the Kasai Maru. [684]

Tokyo was informed on June 22, 1941 that Germany, simultaneously with its military attack on Russia, planned to establish a pro-German regime in Moscow, and also to set up separate governments in the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic shore nations. Lithuania and Latvia would coalesce and Finland would be annexed to Estonia. [685]



182. Japan Investigates a German-British Rapprochement.



As battles raged on the Russian front in June, 1941 it was believed by some observers that the Russian army would retire to the Ural region to carry on a long war; the Germans, therefore, would seek an early termination of the war, and then would turn to the solution of the British question. There were rumors also that the future objective of the war would be changed and that a peace proposal would be submitted to Britain early in July, 1941. [686] In the light of the foregoing, some concern was felt by Tokyo concerning an unverified report that Foreign



[680] II, 666-667

[681] II, 668.

[682] II, Ibid.

[683] II, 663-669.

[684] II, 670.

[685] II, 671.

[686] II, 672, 673.



137



Minister von Ribbentrop had submitted an anti-Comintern proposal to the British Ambassador in Ankara. [687]

But Ambassador Oshima reported Chancellor Hitler's statement of June 22, 1941, which declared that since Anglo-Russian cooperation had become very evident, a large German force would be sent to the eastern front. Following this statement, German papers emphasized that the Russian campaign was a prelude to the British campaign, and that the two campaigns were indivisible. [688]



183. Japan Gauges World Reaction to the Russo-German Conflict.



Japanese diplomats throughout the world were reporting the attitudes in regard to the Russo-German war of the countries to which they had been assigned. Close attention was paid to the views of England and the United States by all Japanese representatives. Japanese estimates of the public opinion in various countries of the world now follows:



(a) Great Britain.



According to a Japanese report, Prime Minister Churchill's speech of June 22, 1941, in which he promised aid to Russia, was the occasion for the return of Ambassador Cripps to Moscow and the journey of General Sir Archibald Wavell to confer with Russian military forces.

Conferring with the Russian Ambassador in London, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden was reported to have urged Russia to wage a protracted war, for, according to the Japanese interpretation of Great Britain's attitude, unless the war was long-drawn out, Russia would be forced to fight without British assistance. [689] Ambassador Oshima observed that Great Britain, convinced by past failures, which it had experienced "by interfering at the outset of the last several wars", was merely extending verbal encouragement in the belief that it would be dangerous to ally itself with Russia too soon. [690]



(b) United States.



Japan also believed that the United States was following a policy of watchful waiting, and that in the event of a German victory it would not fulfill its promise to aid Russia. It seemed obvious to Japan, on July 4, 1941, that since Mr. Steinhardt, the American Ambassador who appeared to be anti-Russian, had not yet met with the British military mission in Moscow, and since only low-ranking officers were currently located at the American Embassy, no three-power military conference was likely to be under way at this time. [691]

Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow was convinced that Ambassador Steinhardt was hopefully awaiting Russia's downfall since the latter had asked the Japanese Ambassador to question Foreign Minister Molotov concerning the methods of evacuating foreign diplomatic officials from Moscow. Having been asked to defer this question lest he should insult the Russian government, Mr. Steinhardt removed all his diplomatic personnel to distant villas. [692]

In the light of the growing Russian-American solidarity, the Japanese Ambassador in Rome suggested on August 5, 1941 that Japan act immediately to settle its Russian border question. Fearing the task of facing the combined Russian and American forces, he thought it timely for



[687] II, 674.

[688] II, Ibid.

[689] II, 675.

[690] II, 676-677.

[691] II, 678.

[692] II, Ibid.



138



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



Japan to use its occupation of French Indo-China merely as a threat against England and the United States, and at the same time to prepare quickly to attack northward. [693]



(c) Spain.



From Spain came General Franco's request that Spanish volunteers be allowed to assist Germany in its crusade against Communism. Although little military value could be seen in such an alliance, Axis leaders were aware of its importance as material for propaganda in South America. [694]



(d) Sweden.



Internal dissension obscured Swedish foreign policy, but German sources believed that the anti-Russian faction in Sweden was gradually winning more strength than the Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire anti-German group. [695]



(e) Finland.



Ambassador Oshima was informed that Finland's declaration of neutrality was intended to camouflage a lack of preparedness, and that finally, when sufficiently armed, it would launch an attack on its former enemy, Russia. [696] Finnish defenses had been improved during the preceding year, and the eastern border was observed to be firmly guarded. Although no emergency mobilization had been ordered, it was reported that 10,000 men had been called to arms on June 15, 1941. Women's relief detachments had been formed, antiaircraft posts manned, and members of the Young Men's Associations had joined the German forces. [697] On June 26, 1941 Finland entered the war.



(f) Manchukuo.



Repercussions of the Russo-German conflict were watched with special care within Japanese-controlled Manchukuo because of its difficult border problems and internal differences. Immediately after the outbreak of hostilities on Russia's western front, Russian troops along the eastern Manchurian border were observed engaging in athletics. However, Japanese observers, not misled by this pretense, perceived efficient Russian defense preparations going on in the background. [698]

On June 24, 1941 Russia seemed to be refraining from any provocation within Manchukuo, but Japan believed that Russian espionage agents were working with an already established underground organization. The populace seemed to be calm, but some Japanese sympathizers advocated an immediate thrust at Russia. A few White Russians also manifested a desire to rid eastern Asia of Soviet Russian influence. On the other hand, some Japanese were known to be apprehensive lest Manchukuo become involved in the conflict, though the natives expressed no opinion. [699]

The possibility that the Chinese Communist army might move to Outer Mongolia on the pretext that China must defend both Russia and Outer Mongolia was considered by Japan. On June 25, 1941 the Russian army was increasing its supply of armor and armament and mobilizing on the Manchurian border for any emergency. [700]



[693] II, 679-681.

[694] II, 676.

[695] II, Ibid.

[696] II, 677.

[697] II, 682.

[698] II, 683.

[699] II, Ibid.

[700] II, 684.



139



In an effort to prevent the U.S.S.R. from suspecting Japan's hostile attitude, the Japanese Kwantung army maintained an appearance of reserve. Officially, Manchukuo adhered to a policy of friendliness, although many young officers of the Kwantung army favored an offensive to settle the Russian question once and for all. Meanwhile, negotiations were being carried on between the Manchukuo Bureau of General Affairs and Japan regarding the supply of materials in case of a Japanese‑Russian war. [701]

On June 30, 1941 Japanese agents at Hsinking disclosed that the Russian army had in­tensified its scouting along the Russian‑Manchukuoan border, for pursuit planes, replacing bombers, were concentrated in the first lines. This move was believed to indicate that temporary defense preparations had been replaced by permanent fortifications, and that Russia was in readiness for immediate action. [702]

Continual cruising by Russian planes over the Manchukuoan border evoked the disapproval of Japanese authorities, who in early July, 1941 complained to the Russian Consul General in Harbin, whereupon reciprocal charges against the Japanese were received. [703] The Kwantung army had become quite active in northern Manchuria but Japan believed that a tremendous number of troops would be required to occupy the region east of Lake Baikal, and this would occasion many difficulties in governing the region. In addition, should a Japanese invasion be successful, communications would become a major problem. [704]

Tokyo was informed on July 1, 1941 that in Manchuria the working classes were concerning themselves principally with crop conditions, but they feared a Russian attack on Japan. Japanese agents further discerned that Russian nationals in Manchuria, especially young men subject to military service, were apprehensive about the prospective war. In addition some Jews in Manchukuo who appeared to be anti‑German, feared that Japan's entry into the war would affect them commercially. [705]

In view of the fact that espionage activities of other nations might flourish within Man­chukuo, on July 4, 1941 Japanese authorities prepared to restrict the entrance, passage, and residence therein of members of any other nations, especially the United States and England. To carry out this policy, Kwantung authorities were urged to participate in a passport control conference. [706]

It was suggested, on July 4, 1941 that Japanese Foreign Office officials, who from long experience had become well acquainted with Russian affairs, should be assigned to positions in Manchukuo to maintain liaison with the Japanese intelligence organizations in Harbin, Hilar, Botanko, Taoan, and Hei‑ho. [707]

On July 10‑11, 1941 newly assigned Japanese consuls conferred about world conditions as affected by the German‑Russian war, the ability of the Soviet Union to resist Germany, and violences perpetrated by the Comintern against Manchukuo. Russian strategy and the general trend of the Manchukuoan population were also discussed, and opinions were exchanged on matter of espionage and counter‑espionage. Staff Officer Kotani, reporting on the relative quality of Russian forces, stated that both officers and men were of fairly high caliber, particularly in the air and tank forces. He revealed that they exhibited considerable tactical knowledge and ability, and were quite patriotic.



[701] II, 685.

[702] II, 686

[703] II, 687.

[704] II, 688.

[705] II, 689.

[706] II, 690.

[707] II, 691.



140



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



In the event of a war between Russia and Japan, Japan expected that Russia would:



a. Promote riots and strikes in factories;

b. Incite disorganization in the Manchukuoan army;

c. Promote disunity through anti‑Japanese and communistic elements;

d. Instigate activities among the banditry;

e. Engage in destruction and gunfire;

f. Spread disease germs;

g. Throw credit into chaos. [708]



Another important point under discussion was the increasing weakness of Japanese leader­ship among the people of Manchukuo, for which a Japanese spokesman blamed the non-materialization of various plans and conflicting economic policies. [709]



(g) China.



From Shanghai came the announcement that both Soviet and White Russians had enthu­siastically united for the defense of their homeland. [710] At the outbreak of German‑Russian hostilities, the Nanking government under Japanese direction, voiced its opinion that em­phasis should now be placed on peace for China, since it was evident that the Chungking government could no longer depend on aid from Russia. [711] On July 1, 1941 Chinese authorities were reported as speculating concerning the attitude of the Chungking government toward the Chinese Communist Party. It was believed that a comprehensive settlement of the Japanese-Chinese incident resulting from a victory for Germany would eliminate all future anxieties of Japan.

With respect to Russian strength, the Chinese officials discussed whether or not Commissar Stalin would realize, before his complete annihilation, the inevitability of Russia's defeat and would consider a compromise. They pointed out that this would agree with Germany's position, since it was believed that Hitler had no intention of annihilating Russia. In view of the possi­bility of an early conclusion of the German‑Russian war, they felt that it was unwise for Japan and China to rupture existing relations with Russia. [712]

Though there were some Chungking authorities who seemed to advocate the coalition of Chungking with Great Britain and the United States, Japanese agents reported that a great majority were of the opinion that no definite steps should be taken until a favorable situation had been reached in world affairs. With this policy in mind, Chungking authorities guided public opinion by restricting all newspapers from favoring too much either Germany or Rus­sia. [713]

Various foreign representatives were extremely active in Chungking on July 1, 1941, especially the Russian Ambassador who proposed a Chungking‑Russian alliance. In reply, China's Foreign Minister stated that no objection to concluding the alliance existed, but inas­much as Great Britain and America desired to cooperate with Russia in the European war, it was important that China await future developments. In addition, China was aware of the possibility that Russia would collapse in the near future, thus putting an end to all future aid; therefore, it was felt, in accord with the existing sentiment, that these factors should be taken into consideration, if a treaty were to be made between Chungking and Moscow. [714]



[708] II, 692.

[709] II, Ibid.

[710] II, 693.

[711] II, 694.

[712] II, 695.

[713] II, 696.

[714] II, Ibid.



141



It was noted by the Japanese that since the commencement of Russo‑German hostility, Gen­eralissimo Chiang Kai‑shek had softened his demands on the Chinese Communist army, and had been taking the attitude that it would be sufficient if the army merely refrained from revolt against Chungking. In further dealings with the Communist organization, he apparent­ly had promised to consider General Chou En‑Lai's demand for remunerations covering the months of May and June 1941, a demand based on the fact that General Chou En‑Lai's army had strictly observed orders from Chungking and had participated in open warfare against Japan. [715] On August 4, 1941 Japanese intelligence agents were ordered by Tokyo to discover whether or not Russians in Shanghai were transshipping East Indian rubber to Vladivostok, and were purchasing petroleum from American and British firms for delivery to Vladivostok. [716]



(h) Turkey.



By signing a non‑aggression pact with Germany on June 25, 1941 Turkey sought further to guarantee its neutrality in the German‑Russian war, which it had announced on June 23, 1941. It was generally believed at this time that after defeating Russia, Germany would move south­ward from the Caucasus through Iraq and Syria to attack Egypt. [717] On the other hand, Turkey's increasing of her border troops to five divisions indicated to another observer that it intended to avoid war at all cost. It had also sealed the future of Syria by prohibiting the passage of French arms. [718]

On July 12, 1941, however, Japan believed that Turkey, despite its neutral policy at the out­break of German‑Russo hostilities, had begun to manifest through the press its long harbored resentment against Russia. [719] Two weeks later, on July 29, 1941, the Japanese Ambassador in Ankara reported that after occupying the Caucasus, Germany, disregarding its recent pact, would march through Turkey to attack Iraq. War would break out in the Near East by autumn, as Japan saw it, for Turkey had no alternative but to refuse both belligerents or decide to which she would yield. In either case the unavoidable result would be war. The Japanese Ambassa­dor in Ankara was much impressed with German might, and predicted that Germany would soon crush the Turks. [720]



(i) Hungary.



Hungary declared war on June 27, 1941 and now most of the countries of Europe were em­broiled in the war. [721] According to Ambassador Oshima, this tremendous spreading of the war was contrary to the wishes of Germany since Chancellor Hitler's motive was not to destroy world culture, but to save it from Bolshevism. [722] Stressing the necessity of Japan's redoubling its efforts in promoting an Axis victory, Ambassador Oshima pointed out that his country had undertaken such an obligation in signing the anti‑Comintern pact. [723]



(j) India.



Since Japan was cognizant of the role that India might play in the overthrow of English in­fluence in the Far East, it supported the activities of certain Indian revolutionaries. Fearing



[715] II, Ibid.

[716] II, 697.

[717] II, 698‑699.

[718] II, 575.

[719] II, 700.

[720] II, 701‑702.

[721] II, 703‑704.

[722] II, 703‑705.

[723] II, 703.



142



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



that America would endeavor to stimulate liberalism in India, and that Great Britain would attempt to compromise with the Indian Congress, one of these leaders in Berlin, presumably Mr. Bose, sent a message to his colleagues in India via the Japanese diplomatic communi­cation system. It requested some indication of Indian reaction to the Russo‑German war, and urged that any compromise between Great Britain and the Indian Congress be sabotaged.

According to the opinion of this leader, India's only hope for independence lay in an Axis victory. Believing that Germany's victory over Russia was just a matter of weeks, he predicted that Chancellor Hitler would make some pronouncement immediately about India's inde­pendence, and suggested that this pronouncement be followed by a revolution. Arrangements were to be made immediately in order to take over rule of India at the proper time, and reli­able agents, unknown to the British, were to be sent to work in certain localities. India should approve the current Japanese policy in the Far East, including Indo-China, since it conformed to the objective of Indian nationalists. [724]



184. Japan Is Warned of Soviet Strength.



Although first reports from the Russian front pointed to an early German victory, some keen analysts credited Russia with a reserve power suspected by few foreign governments. Despite the fact that many besides Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Ambassador Oshima urged Mr. Matsuoka to declare war against Russia, others, including the First Secretary of the Japa­nese Embassy in Hsinking, formerly attached to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, advised that Russia, possessing rich resources in territory, manpower, and material, and after twenty-four years of communistic education, completely unified behind Stalin, should not be under­estimated.

The former Moscow staff member also pointed to the fact that within the next few months a severe Russian winter would hamper a German advance. Russia's powerful defense line along the Manchukuo border also served as a sign of reserve strength. [725]



185. Russia Seeks Japan's Support of the Neutrality Pact.



From the beginning of hostilities, Russia's Ambassador to Tokyo attempted to cement Russo‑Japanese relations, and tried to determine Japan's feelings with regard to its neutrality agreement with Russia. On June 23, 1941 Ambassador Smetanin called on Foreign Minister Matsuoka to determine whether or not Japan intended to honor the Neutrality Pact. Foreign Minister Matsuoka replied that the Neutrality Pact with Russia had no relation to the Tri­partite Pact, and that the Japanese government was still undetermined regarding its attitude on the present turn of events. However, in discussing Japan's foreign policy with Stalin at a time when he had not anticipated a Russo‑German war, Foreign Minister Matsuoka had stated that Japan would not collaborate with Britain and America.

Declaring that if he had suspected the coming of war between Germany and Russia, he would not have hesitated to have undertaken the role of mediator, Mr. Matsuoka asked Am­bassador Smetanin why Japan was not given such an opportunity. The Russian representative replied that since the terms of the Russo‑German agreement had been carried out whole­heartedly by Russia, Germany could find no cause for complaint, and, therefore, it had at­tacked suddenly without forewarning or a declaration of war.



[724] II, 706

[725] II, 707.



143



To Mr. Matsuoka's inquiry concerning the connection between the unexpected return of Ambassador Cripps to England and Prime Minister Churchill's promise to aid to Russia, Ambassador Smetanin answered that many ambassadors returned home for rest after an extended term of service. The Japanese Foreign Minister again stressed that Japan had thrown in its lot with Germany and Italy; but that since he had always worked for the improvement of relations between Russia and Japan, he felt that an outbreak of hostilities between the two countries would be most unfortunate. Ambassador Smetanin replied that both he and the British Ambassador had also been working directly for the improvement of Russo‑Japanese relations, and that he hoped Mr. Matsuoka's government would take an objective view of the situation. [726]

From Vichy came word that the Russian Ambassador resident there had also sought, on June 25, 1941 to determine the Japanese attitude toward the German‑Russian war. The Japa­nese Ambassador replied that, having received no instructions from Tokyo, he could not very well express an official opinion, but he knew that Japan would consider all conditions very carefully in the light of the Tripartite and Neutrality Pacts. Emphasizing the fact that Russia had been strictly observing the Russo‑German treaty when Germany attacked suddenly, without provocation, the Russian Ambassador expressed the wish that Japan and Russia would maintain friendly relations. [727]

In Tokyo on June 24, 1941 Foreign Minister Matsuoka told the Italian Ambassador, who had called on him, that as yet no policy had been determined with regard to Japan's entrance into the war. He again stressed the fact that neither the Tripartite Pact nor the Neutrality Pact had a direct bearing on each other, and that the Tripartite Pact was still a pivot for Japanese for­eign relations. [728]

Although Japan had made no decision as to its action, Japanese Consul Ota in Vladivostok divulged, on June 26, 1941, that preparations had been made to burn his codes, machines, and special telegrams if an emergency occurred. [729]

According to a Japanese report of June 27, 1941 Foreign Minister Molotov, who believed that Japan had possessed previous knowledge of the German attack, was reminded by Ambassador Tatekawa that Mr. Matsuoka had denied the widespread war rumors during the latter part of May, and that the Japanese government, even if it had received some unofficial warning, was not aware of Germany's decision to attack until a few days before hostilities began. As proof he related that two Japanese officials had left Tokyo for Germany on June 20, 1941 and two others had been dispatched to Iran on June 21, 1941; therefore, it was even conceivable that Japan had no advance information at all regarding the German plan.

Mr. Molotov commented that since there was nothing in the Tripartite Pact regarding Soviet Russia, Japan was not obligated to oppose Russia. Since the two governments were neighbors, he hoped that the recently improved relations between them could be maintained in the future. Expressing a similar desire that nothing should be done to upset their friendly relations, Ambassador Tatekawa indicated that Japan expected Russia to refrain henceforth from agi­tating the laboring classes, and he suggested that the issuance of entrance visas to Russia be expedited. Mr. Molotov denied emphatically the existence of a pre‑war British‑Russian alliance, but admitted that arrangements were made for such a treaty after the outbreak of war. [730]



[726] II, 708.

[727] II, 709.

[728] II, 710.

[729] II, 711.

[730] II, 712.



144



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



186. Ambassador Tatekawa Urges Support of Neutrality Pact.



Ambassador Tatekawa, expressing his views on June 27, 1941 with regard to Japan's immi­nent decision, stated that he realized the difficulty of the situation for the Foreign Office since Japan was divided in opinion. Despite the fact that some gesture of support for the Tripartite Pact should be made, he believed that since Japan in all probability would not be capable of offering Germany complete military cooperation, it would be well to maintain the status quo and to exert every effort to conclude the China affair. Though Ambassador Tatekawa was aware of the current German victories, he stated that there were no guarantees against some radical change in the war situation. [731]



187. Germany Seeks Active Support for the Tripartite Pact.



As the Russian war progressed, German authorities pressed for Japan's aid, but Foreign Minister Matsuoka reminded Ambassador Oshima in Berlin that at the time of his visit to Germany, Herr von Ribbentrop had said nothing about seeking Japan's help. Since Herr von Ribbentrop seemed to be puzzled because Japan was not making necessary preparations to take part in the war, Mr. Matsuoka explained to Ambassador Ott, on June 27, 1941, that he had assumed that Germany was not anxious to have Japan join in the war against Russia. [732]



188. Japanese Ambassadors in Rome and Berlin Urge Support of Germany.



The Japanese Ambassador in Rome declared, on June 30, 1941, that if the present Cabinet adopted an anti‑Russian policy, the world would receive the impression that Japan was an opportunistic country. Therefore, he urged the adoption of some intermediate step to precede any military action against Russia. [733]

The Japanese Ambassador in Rome also urged Japan to assist in eradicating the power of Russia, the great root of all evil, and pointed out that Japan, for its own self‑interest, needed to prevent other powers from using Asiatic Russia as a base for anti‑Axis assistance. He be­lieved that a clear statement of policy would strengthen the morale of Japan's people at home, and would contribute to an adjustment of military relations with the Axis. This would make it easier for other nations to understand Japan's position. [734]

Ambassador Oshima continued to favor Japan's entrance into the war on the side of the Axis. Pointing out on June 28, 1941, that Japan's indecision, as reflected in the many con­ferences being held in Tokyo and reported in the European press, affected the honor and inte­grity of his country, the pro‑Axis Ambassador urged Foreign Minister Matsuoka to disregard further arguments and to come to an immediate decision. [735] The Japanese Ambassador to Turkey also supported the views of his colleagues in Berlin and in Rome that Japan should take advantage of the splendid opportunity to settle its problems with Russia rather than desist because of American and English pressure. [736]

Foreign Minister Matsuoka responded, on June 28, 1941, to Ambassador Oshima's repeated requests for instructions concerning Japan's attitude towards the war by advising him to be patient until a final decision was reached. Promising to send instructions in a few days, he



[731] II, 713.

[732] II, 714.

[733] II, 715.

[734] II, 716.

[735] II, 717.

[736] II, 718.



145



indicated that there was no unanimity in government opinion. [737] After this, Ambassador Oshima apparently felt that there was no other alternative but to wait for instructions, but he was hopeful that the Japanese government would persuade its people to join the anti‑Russian war. [738]



189. Japan Decides Against Intervention in German‑Russian War.



On July 2, 1941 the Japanese Diet in the presence of the Emperor reached its decision, and Foreign Minister Matsuoka informed Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop that, although Japan would not fail to act in accordance with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact, it was imperative that it not relax its efforts in the south at this time; thus, it would be contrary to Japan's best in­terests to break off relations with Russia. However, as a vital contribution to the common cause of the Axis, Japan would secure bases in French Indo-China to strengthen its pressure upon Great Britain and the United States. [739] Japan's policy was summed up by Foreign Min­ister Matsuoka as follows:



1. Imperial Japan shall adhere to the policy of contributing to the world peace by establishing the Great East Asia Sphere of Co-prosperity, regardless of how the world situation may change.

2. The Imperial Government shall continue its endeavor to dispose of the China incident, and shall take measures with a view to advancing southward in order to establish firmly a basis for her self‑existence and self-protection. [740]



Mr. Matsuoka had conveyed the Cabinet's decision to Ambassador Smetanin on July 1, 1941. At that time both agreed to issue written statements to the effect that friendly Japanese-Russian relations must be preserved at all costs. Stating that the Japanese government wished to extend its good offices to both Germany and Russia, Mr. Matsuoka expressed his wish that in the light of the complexity of the situation and Japan's difficult position, Russia would exercise due caution. [741]

Foreign Minister Matsuoka also sent an oral statement to Foreign Minister Molotov in which he expressed Japan's hope for a speedy termination of hostilities between Germany and Russia, or at least that they not be extended to the Far East where Japan had many vital interests. [742]

That Germany was displeased with Japan's decision can not be doubted for Herr von Ribbentrop, aware of the division of opinion in the Japanese government, had sent an urgent message to Tokyo, through Ambassador Oshima, which had arrived too late to change the course of events. [743] This displeasure was reflected in the actions of Ambassador Oshima, a strong supporter of the Axis, who on the following day, July 3, 1941, requested that he be called back to Tokyo because of illness. [744] It was also evident that disagreement with the final decision existed in the Japanese Foreign Office itself. [745]

Foreign Minister Matsuoka sympathized with Ambassador Oshima in regard to his physical condition, but, on July 5, 1941, he insisted that the Japanese Ambassador to Germany should sacrifice personal desire for the good of his country by remaining in Berlin. Assuring his



[737] II, 719.

[738] II, 720.

[739] II, 721‑727.

[740] II, 727.

[741] II, 728‑729.

[742] II, 723‑724.

[743] II, 721‑722.

[744] II, 730.

[745] II, 731.



146



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



representative in Germany that the German, Italian, and Russian Ambassadors had received oral statements in explanation of Japan's position, Mr. Matsuoka felt confident that Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop would fully understand. [746]



190. Germany Is Displeased with Japan's Non‑Intervention.



In a message of July 12, 1941 which appeared to be directed to Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, Mr. Matsuoka reiterated Japan's reasons for its decision. [747] Explaining that since Japan was not a dictatorship, and at present it was disunited in its feeling toward the Russo-German crisis, and since some of the Japanese people still entertained a sentimental feeling for Great Britain and the United States, he pointed out that Japan could not under any circumstances support Germany in its drive against Russia.

Mr. Matsuoka said that although Germany's current victories were inspiring, there were some differences of opinion between the Germans and the Japanese regarding the possibility of the United States entering the war. Though Germany minimized the possibility of United States' intervention, and would continue to do so, [748] Japan, not reassured, expressed the desire that the Axis take some common measure to prevent such a possibility. [749]

Despite the agreement of July 2, 1941, all was not smooth sailing between Japan and Russia for on July 12, 1941 Ambassador Smetanin again visited Mr. Matsuoka to relate that the British and American Ambassadors had informed him of a statement, supposedly issued by the Japanese Foreign Minister, that the neutrality agreement with Russia had become an impotent instrument, and that Japan did not feel obligated to adhere to its terms. [750] Mr. Matsuoka explained that he felt neither the Neutrality Pact nor the Tripartite Pact were applicable to the present war, though Japan's foreign policy was based on the Tripartite Pact. Neither Germany nor Italy had invoked the Tripartite Pact to demand Japan's entrance into the war, and Mr. Matsuoka predicted that such a demand would not be forthcoming. Japan would determine its policy independently and without regard for either treaty.

Mr. Matsuoka then asked about reports concerning the transferring of Kamchatka from Russia to the United States, and the infusion of British military officers and other personnel into Siberia. He stated that such reports tended to excite Japanese public opinion. [751]



191. Japanese Reports on Progress of Russo‑ German War.



Reports from Japanese Foreign Office representatives in the field kept Mr. Matsuoka in­formed of the progress of the war:



(a) Report from Moscow.



Ambassador Tatekawa, reporting on wartime conditions in Moscow, revealed that since the beginning of hostilities he had noted long food lines. Strict military control was being exercised over all dwellings and dormitories, and though crowds listened to air defense instructions in every open space, little enthusiasm for the war was being shown. [752]



[746] II, 732.

[747] II, 733‑735.

[748] II, 736.

[749] II, 735.

[750] II, 737‑738.

[751] II, Ibid.

[752] II, 739.



147



On June 23, 1941 the staff of the German Embassy in Moscow had been ordered to vacate the former Polish and Austrian Legations which it had been occupying. Staff members were to be cared for at dwellings belonging to the Embassy, but all telephone connections and contact with the outside were severed. Since the Italian Embassy had no communication from its home government, Mr. Tatekawa could not predict when its staff members would leave for Italy. [753]

According to the Japanese Ambassador, Russian air defense maneuvers were carried out with considerable effectiveness, and all citizens seemed to maintain an attitude of calm. On June 24, 1941 he noted a decrease of the use of cabs in the city, and diminishing food lines because of the abundance of food. [754] A Russian communiqué, which was sent to Tokyo, announced that Russian counter offensives on the Western border appeared to be successful since on the first two days of the war 50,000 prisoners had been taken, and 300 tanks destroyed. [755]

Several weeks later on July 15, 1941, Japanese representatives in Moscow believed that Germany would succeed in entering the Russian capital from several directions, if it won battles at Polotsk and Vitebsk which appeared to be the key to the whole war. They pointed out, however, that Russian strategy featured a defense strip 40 kilometers in depth, which was capable of holding for a long time, and unless the Germans succeeded in breaking through the last defense bases within two weeks, considerable time would be required to reassemble attacking forces.

Since it was believed that about one‑third of the cream of Russian air and mechanized forces had been lost in the first day's battles, the Japanese in Moscow reported that the complete defeat of Russia was only a matter of time. An acute shortage of food and daily necessities already was being felt in Moscow, and, if the war continued, a strict ration card system was to go into effect. [756]



(b) Report from Vladivostok.



The Japanese Consul General in Vladivostok, reported the situation on June 23, 1941 as being calm as on previous days with coastal defense areas under rigid military control. [757] On June 25, 1941 a detailed report of conditions in Vladivostok since the outbreak of hostilities was transmitted to Tokyo. The mobilization of Russian troops had been observed, and Mr. Ota reported that apparently no change had occurred in the citizens' attitude toward Japan.

The Russian fleet, although inactive for several days, had been noted departing for man­euvers, leaving one light cruiser, a mine layer, a submarine tender, four destroyers and ten to twenty submarines in the harbor, all apparently undergoing repairs. [758] Fleet and air exercises which appeared to be designed for defense against Japan were greatly handicapped by the number of ships under repair in the harbor. [759]

A few days later, on July 3, 1941, Russian naval authorities seemed to be intensifying their security program and to be preparing to meet any eventuality. [760] Shipment of arms and food stuffs from Vladivostok had been reduced considerably by July 8, 1941 and rigid control limited the visible food supply. Tokyo was also informed that official Russian newspapers continued to express the need for taking precautions in regard to the Japanese. [761]



[753] II, 740‑741.

[754] II, 741.

[755] II, 742.

[756] II, 743.

[757] II, 744.

[758] II, 745.

[759] II, 746.

[760] II, Ibid.

[761] II, 747.



148



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR





(c) Report from Berlin.



Ambassador Oshima in Berlin kept Japan fully informed of the war's progress from an Axis viewpoint. On the morning of June 24, 1941 Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop divulged to Am­bassador Oshima that up to the night of June 23, 1941 over 2000 Russian airplanes had been destroyed in the air and on the ground, thus annihilating Russia's first line of defense and giving Germany mastery of the air.

Raids conducted by the Russian air force were inconsequential, according to Herr von Rib­bentrop, since German casualties amounted only to twenty dead with no damage to military objectives. It was believed that more than half of the Russian air force had been destroyed on the ground, and since the Russians had proved more unskilled in the matter of handling machinery and piloting planes than had been expected, Germany was confident that it would be as successful in this war as it had been in Poland. [762]

According to Ambassador Oshima, by June 29, 1941, the German army, under the command of Chancellor Hitler who had proceeded to General Headquarters in East Prussia on June 23, 1941 had completely absorbed the enemy on land as well as in the air. Herr von Ribbentrop, who was to follow Chancellor Hitler to the front, reported the satisfactory performance of Ru­manian troops in these advances. [763] He also stated that the Russian navy in the Baltic Sea had been quite inactive and, although the sea passage from Germany to Helsinki was recognized as dangerous, this difficulty would not impede German progress. In concluding his report, Ambassador Oshima pointed out that German successes had exceeded all expectations. [764]

The German Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Oshima on June 24, 1941 that Ger­many, before finishing its preparations in Finland, had begun the war suddenly to surprise Russia. For this reason, Finland was disguising its intentions to collaborate with German troops by pretending to be neutral. [765]

Ambassador Oshima was kept well informed concerning German progress along the eastern front by Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop who revealed on July 3, 1941 that Hungarian forces were quickly following the Russian army which had fallen back, and that the Russian armored forces along the Southern front had been completely surrounded. In the central and northern fronts the Russian troops, caught within the second pincer movement, had been divided, and after a bitter battle on the Finnish front, German forces had smashed into the Petsamo area. German air forces continued to show much activity, but few Russian planes were noted over German territory. [766]

The Chief of the German Trade Bureau, Emil Wiehl, in conference with Japanese Minister Sikao Matsashima on July 3, 1941, reported that in the invasion of Russian territory, the antipathy of the Russian people towards Commissar Stalin had been noted, and in the light of this fact, Germany expected to see an early overthrow of the Stalin regime. [767]

On July 8, 1941 Herr von Ribbentrop again informed Ambassador Oshima of Germany's success, but indicated that, if it were agreeable to Ambassador Oshima, he would stop his special progress reports since the press and radio were releasing the news. [768] Nevertheless, detailed reports of the progress of hostilities continued to flow into Tokyo.



[762] II, 748.

[763] II, 749.

[764] II, Ibid.

[765] II, 677.

[766] II, 750.

[767] II, 751.

[768] II, 752.



149



On July 14, 1941 Ambassador Oshima accepted the invitation of Herr von Ribbentrop to ob­serve front line activities, where he expected to meet Chancellor Hitler. After visiting General Headquarters and inspecting the battlefields, he returned to Berlin on July 19, 1941. [769]

Meanwhile, in addition to the military offensive, the German propaganda office was known to be sending anti‑Russian broadcasts into Russian territory. [770] These attempts to propa­gandize the Russian people were met in turn by Russian interference with Tokyo‑Berlin and Washington‑Berlin telegraphic and telephonic communications, which had been unintelligible on a number of occasions since July 4, 1941. However, photo‑transmission was not impeded. [771]

On August 1, 1941 Ambassador Oshima revealed that according to a "reliable German source," Russian casualties had reached 2,500,000. Marshal Timoshenko's central forces and General Voreshilou's northern forces had suffered serious losses, and Marshal Budenny's troops in the south were gradually becoming victims of German encircling tactics. In the north a striking force was reported to have reached Leningrad on July 30, 1941; however, in accordance with German practice, public announcement was not to be made until the city had definitely fallen. Furthermore, about 10,000 Russian planes had already been destroyed, and it was believed that only one‑third of the Russian air forces remained in action. Because of Germany's policy of not announcing war developments, Russia, Britain and the United States had become flooded with various reports of German set backs, which the anti‑Axis nations were apparently using for political gains in such areas as Turkey. [772]



(d) Report from Hsinking, Manchuria.



Some Japanese observers believed that the Russian forces possessed tremendous air, tank and man power and pointed out that Germany was fortunate in not having delayed its attack, since such hesitancy would have given the Soviet Union time to complete a gigantic arms program. [773]

Discussing Germany's reasons for its sudden onslaught against Russia, Secretary Yoshitami in Hsinking indicated that Germany had 162 divisions on the east front which it could not use elsewhere, and, therefore, it had attacked Russia to win the Ukraine's iron, coal, and grain and Caucasian petroleum. Since Germany did not want to crush England, it felt that a defeat of Russia would help it to achieve an understanding with both England and America. Many British had ties with Germany, e.g., the Duke of Windsor who had been exiled to Amer­ica by Prime Minister Churchill because of his pro‑German feeling. [774]

According to Secretary Yoshitami, the fact that Russian forces remained at their post with­out retreating was a welcome discovery since German strategists placed much importance on annihilating the enemy in the field of operations, and Germany's real objective was the crushing of the Russian army to remove all anxiety in the future. [775]

Germany hoped that its attack on Russia would lessen war sentiment in the United States. Furthermore, Herr Hess' flight to England had been designed to obtain British collaboration in a struggle against Communism. Even if Germany failed to gain British support for its cam­paign against Russia, it would obtain enough materials to wage a long drawn out war against England. [776]



[769] II, 753‑754.

[770] II, 755.

[771] II, 756.

[772] II, 757.

[773] II, 672.

[774] II, Ibid.

[775] II, 757.

[776] II, 758.



150



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR



(e) Report from Ankara, Turkey.



On July 31, 1941 Foreign Minister Sorocoglu of Turkey informed a Japanese diplomat that the collapse of Russia would occur in another month or a month and a half. The German Am­bassador in Ankara was also informed that Turkish army circles agreed with this observa­tion. [777]



(f) Report from Stockholm, Sweden.



According to a pro‑German Swedish reporter, who on August 2, 1941 had completed a survey of the front lines in the Baranovitshi area, no matter how much strength Russia could muster, Germany's ultimate success was already established. However, the Russian air force was still very powerful and the Russian reserve strength was undiminished for conspicous resist­ance was being offered around Leningrad. According to this reporter, German officers realized fully that the reserve power of the Red army was great, and that new types of American tanks and planes had been put into action in the region of the Volga and in Siberia. [778]

All was not smooth traveling for the German army since unexpected obstacles rendered it impossible to establish liaison between units. Despite Ambassador Oshima's report that the general public in Russia, particularly the farmers, seemed to welcome the arrival of German forces, and that no actual guerilla warfare was being conducted, [779] the Swedish reporter de­clared:



Since entering old Russia, Germany's greatest ordeals have been the result of guerilla tactics used by the Soviet soldiers and the civilian inhabitants. There is a thickly wooded area in the Pripet swamps. There are still many, many remaining troops taking refuge in it. A German force endeavored to rout them; but knowing nothing of the area, failed completely. These people have become wild men‑savages. When they are on the verge of starvation, in order to seek food they emerge upon the neighboring villages. They know that the only safety for the hopeless is to hope for no safety and with a courage born of desperation they set upon the sentries and tear them to pieces. Such of these as have been taken prisoners are mostly without overcoats. They are all hatless and barefooted, and few of them indeed have any underwear; but they know not the meaning of answering a command. The word obedience is not in their vocabulary and the Germans would be better off without them because whenever they try to handle them, they get their hands burned. [780]



The Germans were discovering that captured Russians were not opposed to the war and did not intend to revolt against the authority of Commissar Stalin. The lack of anti‑Stalin feeling in the Ukraine surprised the Germans, who continued to maintain that they would win the war, but who were uneasy about maintaining postwar peace, since they were conscious that the seizure of Moscow would not terminate the guerilla warfare. Comparing the German‑Russian war to that of Japan with China, and to Napoleon's disastrous campaign in Spain, the reporter said that no one knew what would happen after it ended. [781]



192. Japan Assists in Exchange of Embassy Officials by Belligerent Powers.



Although some Japanese in Germany were preparing to return home, it was expected that difficulty would be met in regard to passage aboard American shipping lines. On June 22, 1941 Ambassador Oshima had requested Tokyo to negotiate so that returning Japanese would be allowed aboard American ships.



[777] II, 759.

[778] II, 760‑761.

[779] II, 757.

[780] II, 760.

[781] II, 761.



151



During July 1941 consultation was carried on with regard to the disposition of the Japanese Naval Mission stranded in Berlin and passage for seventy others through South America. [782] The Japanese Minister resident in Iran requested that a Japanese ship be sent to the Persian Gulf in order to evacuate Japanese residents in that country. [783]

Shortly after the outbreak of the German‑Russian war, plans were undertaken for the reciprocal exchange of German and Russian diplomatic personnel in Turkey. Apparently, the Russian Ambassador was receiving courteous protection in Berlin and the Bulgarian Embassy was taking proper care of German interests in Moscow. [784]

Japan intervened on June 28, 1941 to suggest that diplomats of belligerent countries, who were stranded in Moscow, be exchanged in accordance with international practice. [785] On July 1, 1941 the Russian Embassy in Tokyo requested that Japan assist in the return of 160 members of the families of its staff who planned to sail for Russia on July 6 and July 16, 1941. [786]

As the Russian forces continued to fall back before the German onslaught, the evacuation of Moscow seemed to be inevitable and the Japanese Embassy's officials made preparations to accompany the Russian government in its retreat. A large number of Japanese representatives were in a position to leave permanently, and it was decided to transfer them to other European countries rather than have them return to Japan. [787]

Japan's responsibility for protecting Italian interests in Russia, as well as in several other nations at war with Italy, was recognized with reservations by Moscow, but it appeared that the Italian diplomats had evacuated with the German Embassy's staff. [788] The Italian Embassy in Moscow was quickly put under guard, and by July 6, 1941 Japan had taken over the protection of Italy's property there. [789] The Chinese Embassy in Berlin was to be commandeered by Japanese authorities, since the entire Chinese diplomatic staff had departed for Switzerland on July 10, 1941. [790]



193. Germany Demands Withdrawal of Polish Diplomats from Tokyo.



New developments in German‑Japanese relations centered around Germany's request on July 4, 1941 that the Polish Embassy's staff be withdrawn from Japan. Ambassador Oshima concurred that this was a reasonable demand in light of the facts that Germany and Soviet Russia were at war, and that Germany had consented to Japan's retention of the staff of the Dutch Ministry. [791] But on July 10, 1941 in the midst of arranging for the withdrawal of the Polish diplomats, Mr. Matsuoka hesitated and decided to postpone the evacuation. [792]

In regard to turning over to Germany the lands and buildings belonging to the Polish and Czech diplomatic establishments, the Japanese Foreign Minister stated on July 15, 1941 that Japan had no objections, but it would be difficult to obtain an appropriation for liquidating



[782] II, 762, 763.

[783] II, 763.

[784] II, 764.

[785] II, 765.

[786] II, 766.

[787] II, 767‑769.

[788] II, 768-769.

[789] II, 770‑771.

[790] II, 772.

[791] II, 773.

[792] II, 774.



152



THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR





the liabilities on them. Mr. Matsuoka also stated that Japan would not be in a position, no matter what the future course of events, to make such a philanthropic contribution in regard to the occupied diplomatic establishments of Belgium and France. [793]



194. Japanese‑German Trade Continues Through Russia.



In adopting a comprehensive policy concerning commerce between Japan and Germany, Japan decided that though all new business deals would be postponed, those already under contract would not be cancelled, and payments for deals already arranged were to be kept in the Yokohama Specie Bank. [794]

Although the Axis nations believed that actual fighting in the German‑Russian war would not last very long, officials both in Berlin and Tokyo realized that it would be some time be­fore transportation facilities returned to normal. Japan was very anxious to ensure the safe transmission through Russia of materials purchased in Germany. [795]

Since Japanese firms were anxious to obtain 27,000 tons of freight which had accumulated in Germany, investigators were ordered on July 1, 1941 to divide the goods into priority classifications to expedite delivery of this material within the next six months . [796]

Another difficulty arose over the ownership of Japanese goods en route to Europe through Russia. Although Russia contended that it had proof of German ownership of these goods, Japanese authorities thought it possible to demonstrate that the material had not yet passed out of Japanese possession. With regard to some of the freight, however, it was feared that the certificate required by the Russians for unimpeded passage would not be available. [797]

Despite Germany's activity along the eastern battlefront, trade between Tokyo and Berlin continued. Plans were made, however, on July 15, 1941, to defer the conclusion of a contract regarding the supplying of heavy machinery to Japan until assurance that it would be shipped could be obtained. Negotiations with regard to these and other special items were to be carried on, however, so that the contract could be signed quickly, if necessary. [798]

Japan decided to make payment only after the supplies were delivered, since there was a danger of Germany's canceling the contracts. In view of its increasing needs, Japan was disturbed by its fear that supplies from Germany would soon be greatly reduced. [799]

According to Mr. Matsuoka, Japan had planned to spend, in a five‑year period, the sum of 250,000,000 yen on German machinery, patents and drawings, and also intended to exchange technicians with Germany. However, further reductions in Japanese exports made difficult the problem of repaying to Germany the credit of 100,000,000 yen. Though many questions necessarily awaited settlement of the German‑Russian situation, Japan suggested that a basic agreement be reached as a necessary prelude to economic mutual assistance. [800]

Japanese trade with Italy continued all during the difficult relations between the Axis powers and Russia, but on one occasion Italy refused a Japanese request for permission to ship supplies from Switzerland to Japan, via America. [801]



[793] II, 775.

[794] II, 777.

[795] II, 776.

[796] II, 778.

[797] II, 779.

[798] II, 780

[799] II, 781.

[800] II, 782.

[801] II, 783.



153



195. Admiral Teijiro Toyoda Becomes Foreign Minister (July 18, 1941).



Upon taking office, the new Foreign Minister, Teijiro Toyoda, expressed his desire to clarify Japan's position, and in order to accomplish this, he asked Ambassador Tatekawa, on July 19, 1941, to remain at his post and cooperate with the new faction. [802] Ambassador Tatekawa replied that although he had felt far from equal to his task in Moscow, he had stayed because of his belief in Mr. Matsuoka's policy of directing Russia into the Tripartite alliance, or at least, of keeping Russia from joining Great Britain and the United States. Since, he now expected Japan to formulate an entirely new policy with regard to Russia, it would not be easy for him to carry out plans which violated previous Japanese promises; therefore, he requested his recall to Japan. [803]



196. Japan Hesitates to Provoke Russia.



Two days later, on July 22, 1941, Ambassador Tatekawa reported that since conditions had grown more threatening in the Far East, all Japanese code machines and instruction books in Moscow were to be either burned or destroyed. [804] Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Despite Ambassador Tatekawa's request for a recall, Japan was making special efforts to prevent any activity which would tend to provoke Russia. Several incidents regarding trans­portation of supplies and departure of cargo vessels from Shanghai to Vladivostok were treated cautiously, [805] and suggestions, on August 5, 1941, that the trans‑Siberian railroad be captured in order to facilitate communications between Japan and Germany failed to win Japanese approval. [806]