No. 44.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
15 April 1941
# 230.
Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
In 2 parts, complete.
Secret within the Department.
Concerning my Nos. 136 [a], 146 [b], and 227 [c].
In view of the present Japanese-American relations it is natural that we form a policy keeping these various points in mind.
1. The Tripartite Pact is exhibiting great power and this is giving America a great shock. America is having to consider at last the grave possibility of war with Japan and naturally America does not wish to be fighting on two fronts.
2. The Japanese southward movement will of course progress in accordance with the progress of Italy and Germany, and that it will not stop with a peaceful economic penetration is being recognized. That as a result of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, Japan will at last be free to use force in this area is being realized by America. The British Empire will unite with the Dutch to form counter measures.
3. While these conditions obtain it is absolutely imperative that America exercise her naval strength in the Pacific and as a result the Atlantic will be left at a serious disadvantage.
4. It is necessary also to consider the point that the Foreign Minister (Matsuoka) explained to Ambassador Steinhardt, namely that America by extending aid to China is impeding Japan's southern progress because Japan is forced to restrain China and thus would be handicapped in case of a war with America.
5. America desired the friendship of Russia more than that of Japan and had hoped to line her up with the democracies and thus have her sever relations with Germany and at the same time act as a restraint to Japan. However, this pact has given a set-back to those hopes.
6. The British Empire and various American republics and the Netherlands Indies are bringing economic pressure against Japan, thus, little by little, various American republics are assuming with the United States a strong attitude.
7. American national strength began to manifest itself and by next year would have been a thing to be reckoned with for America is preparing for a long war.
8. The rate of shipping loss in the Atlantic is the thing that will decide the fate of the war. America is worried over these losses and is preparing convoys and is on the verge of actually convoying vessels.
9. Having considered the situation brought to view in paragraphs one to eight, it becomes apparent that at this time Japan should endeavor to cooperate with America for peace. However, the two following paragraphs are also important.
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10. If Japan enters the war the Japanese fleet will have to contend single-handed with the combined fleets of Britain and America, and so regardless of whether Germany and Italy obtain supremacy on the continent and regardless of the outcome of the Atlantic war, there will be no change in the fact that as a result of the neutrality pact signed with the Soviet, Japan will have to shoulder a grant responsibility.
11. When America actually begins to convoy and thus declare herself in the war, we will be faced with a graver problem and thus it behooves us at this present time to try and seek some solution whereby we may maintain peace with America. In view of the war existing today we should endeavor through cooperation with America to maintain peace in the Pacific, to take the first step towards establishing world peace.
[a] Nomura's report of an interview with Secy. Hull on March 8th.
[b] Nomura's report of an interview with Pres. Roosevelt on March 14th.
[c] Nomura's report of an interview with Secy. Hull on April 14th.
Trans. 4-18-41
No. 45
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 April 1941
# 233.
Secret outside of Department.
Today (the 16th) I had an interview with the Secretary of State (Hull) at his residence. He asked that I obtain authorization from my government to proceed with negotiations on the basis of the separate telegram # 234 [a]. (I have been sounding out, by devious means, the U.S. government's motive behind this proposal which is referred to as something like "a proposal for an understanding between the two countries". As it was definitely ascertained that Secretary Hull is in favor of this proposal on the whole, I helped in the writing of the gist of this proposal and had it translated.) He then stated, "If the Japanese government should turn down this proposal after you and I have embarked on conversations regarding it, it would put the United States in a difficult situation. Therefore please do as I have suggested".
Regarding this matter, we officials together with military and navy attaches and Colonel Iwakuro have given much study, with a full cooperation from the entire staff, and with thorough examination of domestic and foreign conditions, we have been working towards the realization of this proposal. However, although this proposal does not touch upon every phase of Japanese-American relations, and there are no doubt points in the details of the proposal which require revision, our opinion is that this proposal, when realized,—
1. Will not in any way conflict with the Imperial edict relative to the Tripartite Pact. (On the contrary there is every assurance that this proposal will meet with His Majesty's approval. ?)
2. It will not conflict with our loyalty to the Tripartite Pact.
3. It will be a step towards realizing our government's sincere aim to maintain peace in the Pacific.
4. It will serve as a basis for Japanese-American agreement when peace resides in Europe again.
Finally, with the understanding that whatever adjustments necessary may be later amended by conference, I earnestly request that we be authorized to proceed with the negotiations.
[a] See I, 46.
Trans. 4-10-41
Page A-36
No. 46
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
17 April 1941
# 234.
In 5 parts, complete.
"The Proposal for an Understanding between the Two Countries."
It is proposed that representatives of the Japanese government and that of the United States conduct negotiations aimed at recovering the traditional friendly relations between the two countries. For the purpose of making this pact binding, both of the governments involved shall be held mutually responsible to uphold the terms contained therein.
The governments of the two countries shall carefully analyze the existing conditions in order to determine the causes for the unfavorable relations of recent months. Furthermore, the recurrence of the various incidents which led from friendliness between the two peoples to bad relations, shall be prevented.
It is fervently desired that through such means all further development of the ever increasing bad blood will cease.
Through mutual cooperation it is hoped that a lasting peace can be established in the Pacific. It is further hoped that through such clear understanding the chaos towards which we are headed, and which threatens to destroy all civilization, will be avoided. Even if that is too much to hope for, it is hoped that at least the further development of the chaotic conditions will be checked. This is what is sincerely desired by the governments of both nations.
In order to obtain concrete results along the above-mentioned lines, it is not believed that a long conference is appropriate at this time as time is of prime importance.
For the purpose of establishing a very wide understanding, this plan, which relies upon each restricting itself on moral principles, has been evolved.
The conference will consider only the matters of extreme importance. All questions which may be agreed upon by the two governments subsequently will be deferred until a subsequent opportunity arrives.
If the two governments are able to clarify or correct the points enumerated below, it is believed that the entire matter of relations between the two countries can be put back on a favorable basis.
1. The international and domestic aspirations of both Japan and the United States.
2. The attitude of each with regard to the war in Europe.
3. The relationship that each government has with the China Incident.
4. Naval and air strength of each in the Pacific as well as its merchant marine.
5. Cooperation between the two with regard to trade and credit.
6. Economic activities of each in the southwest Pacific area.
7. Policy of each country with regard to politically stabilizing the Pacific.
(Part 2)
With the above points in mind, we have drawn up the proposal which is given below. will be presented to the U.S. government for their approval or revision, which it will be presented to the Japanese government for a final and official decision.
1. The international and domestic aspirations of both Japan and the United States.
Japan and the United States are independent nations of equal standing. Each recognizes the other to be a power on the Pacific. Both countries desire the establishment of a permanent peace. It is further recognized that both want to bring about a new era in which relations will be based on mutual reliance and cooperation. It is herewith made clear that the policies of the two countries in this regard are identical.
Page A-37
Both countries recognize the fact that all countries and all races are to live under the principle of the HAKKO ITIU under which all have equal rights. Profits of each will be evenly distributed among all through peaceful means.
Both recognize the need of mutual cooperation in both spiritual and materialistic matters, that each is obliged to protect the other, not destroy it. These are definite and traditional policies of both governments.
Both governments shall mutually respect the traditions of the other on which the nation is built. They shall firmly hold the right to maintain an orderly society as well as the basic moral principles on which life depends. Each is absolutely determined to prevent the entrance of any foreign doctrines which conflict with these domestic principles.
2. Attitude of each country with regard to the war in Europe.
The motive behind Japan's alliance with the Axis was simply a defense measure. It is aimed at preventing those countries which are not at present involved in the war from becoming involved. This fact is herewith made clear.
However, Japan has no intentions of trying to get out of her obligations under the terms of her treaties. On the other hand, Japan's armed forces will move only if and when some country which is not at war at present launches a vigorous military campaign against the Axis powers.
(Part 3)
The United States attitude with regard to the European War:
It is herewith made clear that the United States has not at present and has no intention of entering into an alliance with some foreign country which would force her to take an aggressor's attitude by aiding one of the combatants while attacking the other.
The United States government states that it stands firmly against wars. Its only interest with regard to the present European war is to protect the well being and safety of her own country. All her moves will be determined by only those considerations.
3. The relationship that each has to the China Incident.
President of the United States shall make certain requests, as noted below. If these requests are granted by the government of Japan, then the President of the United States will recommend peace to the Chiang regime.
(a) Chinese independence.
(b) Evacuation of Japanese troops from China, in accordance with the terms of a peace treaty which will be entered into between Japan and China.
(c) (Non-?) unification of Chinese territories.
(d) (Non-?) payment of reparations.
(e) Resumption of the Open Door Policy. As to the exact definition of that policy, United States and Japan will confer at some opportune time in the future.
(f) The joining together of the Chiang government and the Wang government.
(g) Voluntary restriction of large number and organized emigration of Japanese to China.
(h) Recognition of Manchukuo.
If the Chiang government accepts the U.S. President's recommendation, the Japanese government will commence peace negotiations with the then unified Chinese government, or with the elements which have been responsible for the establishment of a new government. These peace negotiations will be conducted directly between the two nations.
The Japanese government will, within the scope outlined above, enter into agreements with China with regard to re-establishment of friendly relations, cooperation in defending each other, and economic coalition.
Page A-38
The peace proposals including the above-mentioned points shall be submitted directly to the Chinese.
(Part 4)
4. Re air and naval strength and navigation on the Pacific.
(a) The United States and Japan, both desiring to maintain peace in the Pacific, shall refrain from maintaining in the Pacific naval and air forces of such strength as to constitute a menace to either one of the countries concerned. Specific steps toward this end shall be taken up at the Japanese-American conference.
(b) Upon the successful conclusion of the Japanese-American conference, the fleets of their respective countries shall exchange courtesy calls to signify the advent of peace in the Pacific.
(c) Upon the settlement of the Japanese-Chinese incident, the Japanese government shall promote in accordance with the wish of and agreement with the U.S. government the recommissioning in the Pacific waters of as many as possible of those vessels which are now in commission. However, the tonnage and other details shall be decided on at the Japanese-American conference.
5. Commercial and financial cooperation between the two countries.
(a) After the acceptance of the present proposal by both governments, if goods being exported by either one of the countries is required by the other, the first shall guarantee to supply the second with such goods.
(b) Suitable steps shall be taken to revive the same commercial relations existing between the two countries before the abrogation of the Japanese-American Treaty of Commerce. Furthermore, if both countries desire to conclude a new commercial agreement this shall be taken up at the American-Japanese conference and the agreement concluded in the usual manner.
In order to promote economic cooperation between the two countries, the United States will agree to extend gold credit to Japan so that she may develop commercial and industrial enterprises which will rebound to economic stability in East Asia and also help to realize Japanese-American economic cooperation.
6. Economic activities of the two countries in the southwest Pacific.
(a) Japan guarantees to carry out her expansion in the southwest Pacific, not by force of arms, but by peaceful means. However, the United States shall cooperate and assist Japan in obtaining materials she needs in this area, such as rubber, oil, tin, nickel, etc.
7. The policies of the two countries regarding political stability in the Pacific.
(a) Japan and America will not sanction the division or annexation of territory in East Asia and the Pacific by European powers in the future.
(b) America and Japan will mutually guarantee the independence of the Philippines, and will discuss means to aid the Philippines whenever she is attacked by a third power.
(c) No discriminations shall be shown against Japanese immigrants in the United States and in the southwest Pacific area and they shall enjoy the same privileges as those enjoyed by immigrants of any other friendly nation.
(Part 5)
Japanese-American conference:
(a) Conference between the Japanese delegates and the American delegates shall take place in Honolulu. The conference shall be opened by President Roosevelt representing the United States and by Premier Konoe [sic] representing Japan. Delegates shall be limited to five members each, not including experts and secretaries.
Page A-39
(b) No observers of a third power or powers shall be permitted to attend this conference.
(c) The conference shall begin, as soon as possible, after the acceptance of the present proposal but shall be limited to discussing specific subjects agreed to by the governments of both countries dealing with prearranged agenda and the text of the present proposal.
Supplementary provision.
The application of the present proposal shall remain for the time being the secret of the governments of the two countries concerned and its publication shall be settled between the two governments.
End
Trans. 4-19-41
No. 47
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 April 1941
# 239.
Part 1 of 3. See I, No. 48, 49.
Part 1 of 3. Secret outside of the department.
Re the latter part of my # 235 [a].
Explanations of the proposed agreement article by article, as follows.
(1) International and national ideologies that are held in common by both Japan and America.
The object of this article is, that inasmuch as the Americans are afraid that Japan is becoming "totalitarian" and take the position that if Japan becomes "totalitarianized" there can be no further negotiations between Japan and America, we would make it plain to them that the ideologies held by Japan are neither "totalitarianism", nor "communism" not yet "democracy", but that they are based upon distinctive traditions that have come down to us from 3000 years back, and that we are not being influenced by any foreign ideologies that are contrary to these. The reason for inserting this article is that they strongly held out for this as being the idea of their highest leaders. Secretary Hull also strongly emphasized this point to me; and looking upon this as a good opportunity for elucidating the Imperial policy, we decided to leave it in after some changes.
(2) The attitudes of the two countries toward the European war.
This clause has to do with the matter in which we have incurred the most suspicion in these parts, because of the Tripartite agreement, and its objectives are:
(a) To make it clear on the one hand that this understanding now under consideration will make no change in the treaty obligations of the Empire incident to the Tripartite agreement, and
(b) To do our utmost to restrain the United States from entering the European war, thus living up to the spirit of Article 3 of the Tripartite agreement, while at the same time,
(c) Avoiding a break between Japan and the United States, and thus accomplishing the purpose of the conclusion of the Tripartite agreement.
(3) The relations of the two countries to the China Incident.
At first the American thought that the China Incident might be brought to a conclusion by having the U.S. President undertake "arbitration" proceedings, or "mediation," but on the other hand as it seemed that the Wang regime would absolutely repudiate this, we explained the various reasons why the Imperial government would find it utterly impossible to accept this. Then with the idea of preventing even the semblance of interference from America in the
Page A-40
China Incident, the article was put in in this way, with the idea that the President would merely offer his "bons offices" for mediation, and that the negotiations would be carried on directly between Japan and China, and that the Chungking regime would be the ones with whom negotiations would be taken up. Also, as the main essentials in the peace terms, the so-called Konoe three basic principles would be recognized, namely, good neighbor friendly relations, cooperative defense against communism, and economic cooperation. In regard to the withdrawal of troops, it was made clear that the troops would be withdrawn on the basis of a treaty to be concluded between Japan and China, that would avoid any stipulations that would be inconsistent with the treaty dealing with basic relations between Japan and China, and its accompanying documents.
As regards the Open Door Policy, the insertion of stipulations concerning special positions in North China and Mongolia, was intended, but, in view of the delicate problem concerning the island of Hainan, this was left out, and the solution of questions pertaining to the interpretation of-the basic principles of the open door and their application was left for future consideration. In regard to immigration they also had their positions to state, but practically speaking there was no objection so this was included. Then again, it was evident that not to include Manchuria in China's territory, would make the recognition of Manchukuo a condition -----.
(continued in part two) No. 48.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 4-24-41
No. 48
The following is the best version the translator can produce, considering the extremely garbled condition of the Japanese text, of what appears to be either an outline of or a comment on a proposal for settlement of all pending problems between Japan and the United States, including the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese incident.
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
April 17, 1941
# 239.
Part 2 of 3.
Secret outside the department.
I do not believe that the aforementioned terms concerning guarantees to the United States which they have proposed contravene the Konoe three basic principles of ----- nor do I believe that they conflict with the treaty concluded last year between Japan and Canada on this matter. Furthermore, I do not consider that they hinder cooperation and assistance between Japan, Manchukuo and China.
But, in case the CHIANG regime does not accept the advice of the President of the United States, I feel that although the United States will bring pressure to bear on Chungking, they will be very loath to put a threat in writing.
(4) Matters relating to naval strength and aerial strength, as well as shipping in the Pacific Ocean.
a. So far the United States has taken the attitude that in order to secure the peace of the Pacific area it was necessary to have a fleet there. Therefore, in case we settle the matter on the basis of this proposal, we may have trouble with the Military of our two respective countries.
Page A-41
b. When it comes to shipping, the United States is suffering for want of ships. Therefore, this proposal is a logical solution. We, ourselves, are suffering for want of ships. This had produced the impetus for the United States to advise peace between Japan and China.
(5) Commercial and Financial Cooperation between the two countries.
This clause is to be drawn up visualizing the United States using her reserve stocks in reconstruction work in our own country and East Asia, and the establishment of purchasing funds, along with credit.
Trans. 4-19-41
No. 49
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
17 April 1941
# 239.
Part 3 of 3.
Secret outside the department.
VI. The activities of our two countries in the Southwestern Pacific.
Since there is the danger that an advance southward militarily by our Empire would lead to war between the United States and Japan, it is held that our progress in that direction must be conducted by peaceful means without resorting to the sword. It has been made clear to me that if we do thus, the United States will support our economic penetration thither. I must emphasize that this promise is the one and only basis of the present proposal for an understanding.
VII. The policy of the two nations concerning the political stabilization of the Pacific.
Through this clause the countries of Europe will suffer some reverses but our Empire will have all to gain and nothing to lose.
(Message incomplete)
Trans. 4-19-41
No. 50
FROM: Tokyo (Konoe)
TO: Washington
April 18, 1941
# 170.
To be handled in government code.
With reference to the matter discussed in your # 233 [a], hereafter we must keep it most secret. First encipher it in government code and then run it through the machine.
[a] Nomura reports conference with Secretary of State Hull on April 16th.
Trans. 4-22-41
Page A-42
No. 51
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
17 April 1941
# 237.
The Secretary of State is exceedingly careful and on his guard against letting anything leak out as to his own opinions, but in the course of our conversation on the 16th, such thoughts as the following were brought out:
(1) The U.S.S.R. are recognized as following a policy of not becoming involved in war themselves, but getting other nations to fighting, and it would seem that the Japan-Soviet agreement too is being taken in the same way.
(2) It seems that he is of the same opinion as Foreign Minister Matsuoka, that a war between Japan and the U.S. would mean the extension of the scope of the European war, and ultimately the destruction of civilization. (However, it is a fact that there is a good deal of contention in the world that Japan must now be disposed of, and there is quite a bit of this feeling among the naval officers as well.)
(3) Even though Hitler's conquests by force may for the time being be successful, the time will come when the people of the nations will revolt, and even though the continent should be brought into subjection, he would be unable to bring the seas under his power.
(4) While the United States at present is making its great objective the repletion of its national defenses, and effective assistance to Britain, the U.S. government is at work formulating policies for the reconstruction of the world after war, (including also its domestic policies).
Trans. 4-20-41
No. 52
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
23 April 1941
# 176.
Secret outside the Department.
On the 23rd the Tokyo Nichi Nichi carried a special Washington dispatch dated the 21st, which seems to indicate that they are aware of the matter referred to in your message # 237 [a].
Domei also sent news, dispatched on the same day, which points suspiciously that they too have gotten wind of this matter.
Under these circumstances it will be very difficult to keep this confidential matter from leaking out, therefore please take strict care not to allow this information to leak out to any Japanese, particularly to Japanese correspondents. (We are taking the same precaution in Tokyo.)
[a] Amb. Nomura reports to Tokyo the implied opinions of Secretary Hull, as brought out in their conversation of 16 April.
Trans. 4-23-41
Page A-43
No. 53
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
23 April 1941
# 247.
Secret outside.
Regarding your # 176 [a].
Those concerned at this office are exercising extreme care to prevent leakage and on the American side only three persons, namely the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Communications (TEISINGHOKA) and the Secretary of the Navy, know about this matter and they are taking particular care in keeping this information from the press and I feel that they will continue to do so.
However, may I be so bold as to suggest that you, at your end, will prevent by your discretion the publication of this matter.
Please wire me the special Domei dispatch in question for our information.
[a] (See 1, 52) Tokyo wires Amb. Nomura that Nichi-Nichi and Domei have published reports indicating that they are aware of the contents of his message reporting the implied opinions of Secy. Hull in their conversation of 16 April.
Trans. 4-24-41
No. 54
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
19 April 1941
# 171.
Re your # 234 [a].
Upon the return of Foreign Minister Matsuoka which is expected in two or three days, we shall be able to definitely establish our stand in this matter. In the meantime we would like to be advised on the following points.
1. Under the terms of this proposal, our southward move would be halted. This would mean that England's back door would be made safe, and the United States would be able to withdraw from the Pacific. The United States could then concentrate all of her efforts on aiding Britain.
Will there not be considerable opposition to this on the grounds that it does not conform with the spirit of the Tripartite Pact.
2. What would happen to United States-Japanese relations if, because of our friendship for Germany, we make quite a number of revisions in the text of the proposal, or if because some action was taken, the instrument became void?
3. From the standpoint of friendship for Germany, would it not be possible to attempt a United States-Japanese joint mediation in the war before deciding upon this pact. What are the possibilities of that?
No doubt the waves of the Pacific will be calmed temporarily if this agreement is entered into. It is clear, however, that should Germany and Italy win the war, Japan would be placed in a very unfavorable position.
Even if, on the other hand, Britain and the United States win, is there not a danger that the two will get together and, disregarding this pact, put the pressure on us in the same manner as they did subsequent to the last war?
5. Although the United States claims that her attitude towards the European war will be determined solely by measures to best defend her own safety, are there not indications that
Page A-44
the United States will enter the war, disregarding the pact, to prevent the downfall of the British Empire.
6. What concrete measures does the United States have in mind when they claim that they will give us strong support in exchange for their getting the necessary materials from the southwestern Pacific area? What will the United States actually do in the event that any of our demands in the above area are turned down by those countries?
The United States will supposedly support us in the matter of emigrants to the above-mentioned area. How does the United States intend to help us in areas which are not under her jurisdiction?
is the exact area of the southwestern Pacific as it is used here? Is Australia included in it?
(Translator's note: Paragraph 7 badly garbled, contains much guess work).
Revised version of Paragraph 7
7. The United States and Japan could divide up the holdings of various European countries in the Far East and in the southwest Pacific area without the consent of those nations involved. Will the United States be prepared to do so? Does the United States have any intention of supporting Japan's peaceful penetration of this area?
7. Japan and the United States are to refuse to recognize any dividing or annexing in the Far East or in the southwest Pacific region by any European power. Recognition of any such changes can be made only by Japan and the United States.
Is the United States prepared to accept those conditions?
Also does the United States intend to approve of Japan's intention to promote peaceful penetrations?
[a] See No. I, 46.
Trans. 4-19-41
No. 55
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
April 20, 1941
# 244.
Re your # 171 [a] of the 19th.
My opinions:
No. 1. You ask if there not be considerable criticism on the grounds that this proposal contravenes the spirit of the Tripartite Pact. Many people in Japan may so conceive it and we might be justified in assuming that the American Government officials also hope through this means to concentrate on assistance to Great Britain. However, my views on your question are specifically as follows:
a. Even though this proposal is accepted, our Empire's duty, based upon Clause 3 of the Tripartite Pact, will not be lessened. In fact, the danger of a war between Japan and the United States as a result of the Axis Alliance will be diminished. Therefore, England could not be considered as thereby securing complete backing by the United States. With the exception of a certain relatively small amount of armaments necessary for warfare in the Atlantic, the United States cannot quickly withdraw her hand from the Pacific. Similarly, although we have concluded a neutrality agreement with the Soviet, we cannot withdraw our forces from Manchukuo.
[a] See I, 64, in which Tokyo asks to be advised on certain points re the Hull proposal.
Trans. 4-23-41
Page A-45
No. 56
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
April 20, 1941
# 244.
Part 2 of 5.
b. By this proposal, the danger of a war between Japan and the United States resulting from the activities of either country will be reduced and by the same token the danger of a conflict between the United States and Germany will be lessened. On the other hand, granted that after the establishment of this understanding the United States will give more assistance to Great Britain, our Empire will be able thereby all the better to restrain the United States from participating in the European War. This coincides with our duty to support Germany in her desire to have no trouble with the United States and strengthen the spirit of the Tripartite Treaty.
c. If this proposal is accepted, our Empire's right to speak in the international situation will be greater than ever and, through the exercise of that right, who knows what advantages may ultimately accrue to us.
No. 2. In case this proposal comes to naught, I can see no alternative to relations between Japan and the United States following an ever worsening path.
Trans. 4-23-41
No. 57
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
April 26, 1941
# 244.
Part 3 of 5.
No. 3. Concerning the possibility you mention in your third question, I have directly sounded out the opinion of certain high American officials and now when relations are so strained between Berlin and Washington, I can see little chance of each mediation; but if we go ahead and conclude this agreement, later on such a possibility is all the more likely to come.
No. 4. The anxiety you express in this question indicates that you are thinking only of the present, when relations between Japan and the United States are so strained. Through an agreement like this, we can settle the Chinese trouble very quickly, open the gates for the passage of raw materials and, having so improved our position through the exercise of this agreement, we would certainly be in a very much better position to cope with the situation after the war. In fact, I consider the acceptance of this proposal as the best means of meeting the postwar situation.
Trans. 4-23-41
No. 58
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
20 April 1941
# 244.
Part 4 of 5.
No. 5. There is a strong feeling in the United States now to shun the European War and to provide for the stability and security of the United States itself. This is to be made plain in the proposal. According to the draft, the United States will assist England by measures short
Page A-46
of war and will not make a declaration of war directly against Germany. However, if the United States disregards this understanding and should fight, it is clear that we are free to act independently on the basis of the Tripartite Alliance.
No. 6. In exchange for their getting the necessary materials from the southwestern Pacific, the United States promises us cooperation and support. However, I should prefer to leave the details to future negotiations. In connection with the aforementioned question, the United States' right to speak in various British possessions and in the Netherlands Indies is increasing. Therefore, their good offices will be most effective beyond any question. By the southwestern Pacific, I do not believe that Australia is meant.
Trans. 4-23-41
No. 59
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
April 20, 1941
# 244.
Part 5 of 5.
No. 7. I do not believe that the United States has any desire to take over any of the islands of the southwestern Pacific; but there is a possibility of her using them under some such guise as cooperative exploitation. Furthermore, I do not believe that in the years to follow the United States will interfere with our peaceful penetration into this area.
Summing all this up, just as in the case of the Tokyo-Moscow Neutrality Treaty, the present proposal is the logical complement to the Axis Alliance which is the keynote of our national policy and I wish to point out that I do not believe that the effectiveness of Clause 3 of the Tripartite Treaty, which is the basis of the Axis Alliance, will be measurably impaired thereby. In my own opinion, if the United States is left to drift along as she now is, ultimate American participation in the European War and an additional struggle between Japan and the United States is certain to ensue. Prevention now will be better than cure later on. I feel that the acceptance of this proposal will coincide to the best general interests of the Axis.
After you have conferred upon this message with the War and Navy, please reply.
Trans. 4-23-41
No. 60
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
23 April 1941
# 249.
(Revised translation.)
This evening I was invited to the private residence of an influential member of the Cabinet who has had some connections with the item mentioned in my # 244 [a], and I was asked by him as to the approximate date when ----- would arrive from Japan. To which I replied that I was expecting ---—- to arrive in two or (three?) -----.
The Cabinet member then, prefacing his remark with the explanation that it was entirely unofficial, stated that he would like to say with the kindest of intentions that "though Hull is slow in making up his mind, when once he has made it up it is not easy for him to change his attitude. ----- and that unless there are some fundamental changes in the general principles
Page A-47
set forth and ----- Hull's attitude toward the (higher officials ?), these conversations will end in a rupture.
(Secret outside the Department.)
[a] (See I, 59-59.) In reply to a request from Tokyo, Ambassador Nomura expresses his opinion in regard to several points of the Hull proposal.
Trans. 4-28-41
No. 61
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
25 April 1941
# 183.
Regarding your # 249 [a].
From Vice Minister to Wakasugi:
As the Foreign Minister has just returned and needs a rest, it will take at least two weeks before instructions will be issued.
[a] See I, 60.
Trans. 4-28-41
No. 62
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
26 April 1941
# 253.
Part 1 of 2.
From the standpoint of the Imperial Government's diplomatic policy, it is truly a marvelous thing that through your efforts our relations with Moscow have been adjusted because this has been an unsettled problem for many years. I also think that what you have done will have an excellent effect upon our diplomatic relations with the United States. After such a long trip and such arduous labors, I know how tired you must be. However, I would like to receive a reply immediately concerning the matter mentioned in my # 233 [a]. I am very anxious about this because I know how intimately you and I discussed this matter before I came to Washington. Subsequently, on two occasions, Your Honor discussed this matter with Ambassador STEINHARDT in Moscow. I am sure that you must have discussed your attitude with the Government and compared it with the intentions of our officials.
Now, if we keep postponing any action on this matter, it is going to be very difficult for both sides to maintain secrecy. I already suspect that there may be people in the American Cabinet, besides the three men who have so far been involved, who entertain considerable suspicions about what is going on. I also fancy that various policies opposing what I am trying to do may be developing in our country. The course of the European war is arousing the United States very much now and if we are too late in the establishment of this understanding, naturally it will lose its coercive effect. I dare say that already they are becoming a little dubious about the advisability of taking such a step. I fear that if we wait any longer disastrous results will ensue. So let us finish the deal forthwith.
[a] See I, 45.
Trans. 4-29-41
Page A-48
No. 63
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
April 26, 1941
# 253.
Part 2 of 2.
I do not doubt but what you are greatly worried about the effect of such an agreement upon nations friendly to us, but I do not feel that any anxiety will be justified. Since I got my instructions at all, fourteen days have passed. Now when a man is all heated up to wait two weeks without hearing anything is almost more than he can stand. So please consider my position in this matter.
When I presented my credentials to the President, I told him that it was my intention to endeavor to improve relations between Japan and the United States. I fear that by now the Government of this country is beginning to doubt whether there was anything in what I said. If so, they must suspect that I am not voicing the intentions of the Imperial Government. Time and again when I have had opportunities for conferences with the Secretary of State, I believed that what I have to say coincides in general with the opinions of my Government. Will you not please consider my prestige with the Government of the United States?
Trans. 4-29-41
No. 64
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington
April 30, 1941
# 187.
Re your # 234 [a].
Please send the English text by wire.
[a] See I, 46.
Trans. 5-1-41
No. 65
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
April 30, 1941 http://Louis-J-Sheehan.biz
# 255.
Re your 187 [a].
I am sending you the English text in my # 256 [b] (urgent in eight parts). I have not super-enciphered this, so please handle very carefully.
[a] See I, 64.
[b] See I, 41.
Trans. 5-2-41
Page A-49
No. 66
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
3 May 1941
# 262.
When I met the Secretary of State on the 2nd, I told him that, in view of the tense relations existing between the two nations, we would like to have very careful consideration given to the question of embargoes, and as for the matter of expansion toward the Philippines, this would excite our people, inasmuch as these islands geographically are close neighbors to us.
He seemed to take an understanding attitude toward the latter item, but he said that with every energy being exerted in national defense, trade controls are inevitable, and, going as far as to point out our discriminatory measures in China, he gave no indications of readily complying. He also evinced firm determination in saying that if Hitler's mailed fist should come to extend over the seven seas, the world would be turned back into the dark ages of 300 years ago, and that such a drift must be resisted, though it takes any number of years. Citing Germany's difficulties in handling Poland, where she has all she can do to preserve peace and order with a large force of 700,000 troops, he intimated that we would have a similar problem with the occupied areas of China. Suspecting that this is the general impression of late, I explained that the Chungking government is becoming very much weakened, that the morale of their army is deteriorating, that with a shortage of ammunition they are losing their fighting spirit, and that whereas in the past the Imperial forces could meet them in the ratio of one to ten, at present they can meet them with one to twenty.
Trans. 5-6-41
No. 67
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
3 May 1941
# 191.
In three parts, complete.
Separate telegram to my # 190 [a].
Strictly confidential.
Oral statement of the Foreign Minister of Japan:
"Upon my arrival in Tokyo in the afternoon of April 22, 1941, I was apprised at once of the contents of the project of an agreement between Japan and America which was cabled by our Ambassador Admiral Nomura a few days prior to my return. I should have taken the matter up immediately, but I could not divide my attention to any question other than reporting on my recent journey to Europe and taking steps to complete the procedures necessary to putting into effect the pact of neutrality concluded at Moscow between Japan and the U.S.S.R. After disposing of them, I have been obliged to remain inactive for a few days due to an indisposition. As a matter of fact, I have only been able to resume work today. The project necessarily claims very careful and thorough consideration and it will take some days yet before I can express my opinion more or less definitely on the various and multitudinous points contained in the project, some of which are of a far-reaching character. I need hardly assure Your Excellency that I shall do my best to reach a speedy decision, as the nature of the project obviously calls for as early a disposition as possible.
"Having enjoyed the privilege of an acquaintanceship with the President since he was the Assistant Secretary of the Navy and having also had the pleasure of meeting Your Excellency
Page A-50
at Washington some eight years ago, I feel that I would not be considered as making entirely useless and obtrusive remarks if I took the advantage of this opportunity frankly to bring to the knowledge of Your Excellency and, through Your Excellency, of the President, some of the things I observed during my recent trip to Europe. The German and Italian leaders are determined never to have peace by negotiation, they demand capitulation. They seem to regard that the war is as good as won even at the present stage, with the expulsion of British soldiers from the Balkans, there is not one British soldier left on the European continent from Norway to the Balkans and the Soviet Russia maintains her neutrality supplying them even with what they need. To support this view, they further point out the vast difference between the conditions which prevailed in the European continent and elsewhere at the end of the first twenty months in the last Great War and those now prevailing in Europe and elsewhere after the lapse of the same twenty months since the commencement of the present war. I may add also, for what it may be worth, that these leaders feel that the American entry into the war will not materially affect the final issue, although they are ready to admit that in that event, the war is likely to become protracted. Whatever views Your Excellency or the President may hold, it is, I trust, always worthwhile and interesting to know what other parties are thinking.
"Of course, I reserve my own opinion on this point, but I must confess that my sole and primary concern is, as Your Excellency must know by my utterances on several occasions, that the American intervention is fraught with a grave danger of prolonging the war to the untold misery and suffering of Humanity, entailing, who knows, in its wake, and eventual downfall of modern civilization. In that eventuality, there would be no more question of Democracy or Totalitarianism on earth. Even at this moment, I shudder at the mere thought of such a dire possibility. The key to prevent or to hasten such a possibility to be translated into probability is largely held in the hands of the President of the United States. This has been my view ever since the outbreak of the European War. I need hardly add that Japan cannot and will not do anything that might in the least degree adversely affect the position of Germany and Italy to whom Japan is in honour bound as an ally under the Tri-Partite Pact. Such a caution on Japan's part, I trust, will be readily appreciated by Your Excellency."
[a] See I, 68.
Trans. 5-4-41
No. 68
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
3 May 1941
# 190.
In two parts, complete.
(To be handled in Chief of Mission Code.)
I have read your successive messages, and I understand fully your difficult position and your anxiety in view of Japanese-American relations, as seen from our side, and especially in view of America's present relations to the European war. However, from our standpoint, in considering Japanese-American relations and the European war situation it is necessary for us to give careful study to the effect that such an agreement would have upon the Japan-Germany-Italy alliance, upon Japanese-Soviet relations that have become very delicate since the conclusion of the Japanese-Soviet neutrality pact, and upon China, and especially to the effect it would have upon the Greater East Asia program, as well as upon the South Seas area. Therefore, it is only natural that some days should elapse before a definite opinion could be formulated. I am sure you will have no difficulty understanding this point.
PAGE A-51
(Since my return to Tokyo I have been laid up several days with my chronic ailment, bronchial catarrh, and today is the first day I have been able to come to the office.)
However, as it may have been improper to let so much time elapse without making some acknowledgment, I would like to have you hand Secretary Hull the separate message in English, as a non-committal reply. At the same time you might suggest to the Secretary as your own idea that, following the precedent of the neutrality pact, which I concluded with the U.S.S.R., the non-aggression item be eliminated and also it would be well to include articles that would ensure the permanent neutrality of the Philippine Islands, and assure nondescriminatory treatment of Japanese subjects in those Islands.
Could you not lightly say to the said Secretary:
"How would it be to enter into a simple and clear-cut Japan-U. S. neutrality agreement? Of course, it goes without saying that an exception will have to be made if it becomes necessary for us to act in order to fulfill our obligations under the Tri-partite Pact."
You could make the above statement as if it was something that just happened to occur to you and in that way size up the situation with regard to whether or not there is a possibility of actually entering into such an agreement.
Judging from U.S. traditions, it can be foreseen that the United States will not readily favor an instrument like a neutrality pact. (Such a pact involves the necessity of a troublesome ratification by the Senate.) On the other hand, I cannot believe that there is absolutely no hope for success.
Moreover, to definitely ascertain that there is absolutely no hope for establishing a neutrality pact, would be of much value to us in our negotiations for the "Understanding" pact.
In the event that a neutrality pact is entered into, what seems to be the possibility of having an "understanding" agreement also, which would include secret clauses to be applied in time of war?
In other words, what I propose is to first of all enter into an agreement which can be published and which would be considered as a sort of a diplomatic blitzkrieg.
Please propose this to the other party as your own thought, and advise me of the result.
Trans. 5-4-41
No. 69
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Nomura)
7 May 1941
# 197.
Regarding my # 190 [a].
We must map out a program of the second phase. This depends on the attitude of the United States.
Since time is of paramount importance, please advise us immediately of Secretary Hull's reply. [b]
[a] See I, 68 of 3 May 1941, in which Matsuoka finally replies to Nomura's series of messages, and gives instructions for handing Secretary Hull an "Oral Statement", while attempting to sound out the possibility of a "Neutrality Pact".
[b] See I, 81 (Wash-Tok # 273 of 7 May) for Nomura's report on the reply.
Trans. 9-5-41
Page A-52
No. 70
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
5 May 1941
# 192.
According to a fairly reliable source of information it appears almost certain that the United government is reading your code messages.
Please let me know whether you have any suspicion of the above.
Trans. 5-5-41
No. 71
FROM: Berlin (Oshima)
TO: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
3 May 1941
# 482.
STAAMAA called on me this day (evening?) and stating that this request was to be kept strictly secret, he said that Germany maintains a fairly reliable intelligence organization abroad (or-"in the U.S."?), and according to information obtained from the above-mentioned organization it is quite (or-"fairly"?) reliably established that the U.S. government is reading Ambassador Nomura's code messages, and then asked that drastic steps should be taken regarding this matter.
There are at least two circumstances substantiating the above (suspicion). One circumstance is that Germany is reading our code messages -----. Regarding this, during my previous residency here, they were known to have a large scale cryptanalytic organization-
(unfinished-last two-thirds not available)
Trans. 6-5-41
No. 72
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Berlin (Oshima)
5 May 1941
# 370.
Please express our appreciation to STAAMAA for the information in question and ask him if it is not possible to give us the authority for the statement that it has been fairly reliably established that the U.S. government is reading our code messages, so that we might take appropriate action. Reply requested.
Trans. 6-5-41
PAGE A-53
No. 73
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
5 May 1941
# 267.
Most Guarded Secrecy.
Foreign Office Secret.
Re your # 192 [a].
For our part, the most stringent precautions are taken by all custodians of codes and ciphers, as well as of other documents.
On this particular matter I have nothing in mind, but pending investigation please wire back any concrete instances or details which may turn up.
[a] See I, 70.
Trans. 5-6-41
No. 74
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Nomura)
7 May 1941
# 198.
Regarding your # 267 [a].
This matter was told very confidentially to Ambassador Oshima [b] by the Germans as having been reported to them by a fairly ("rather" or "pretty") reliable intelligence medium; but to our inquiry they are said to have refused to divulge the basis on which they deemed it to be practically certain.
[a] See I, 73 Nomura requests further details of the basis for the report that his code msgs are being read by the U.S. government.
[b] General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Berlin.
Trans. 7-5-41
No. 75
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 20, 1941
# 327.
INTELLIGENCE:
Though I do not know which ones, I have discovered that the United States is reading some of our codes.
As for how I got the intelligence, I will inform you by courier or another safe way.
Trans. 5-21-41
Page A-54
No. 76
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington, Bangkok, Rome
7 May 1941
# 1015.
Circular.
Immediately upon receipt of this message, use 1941 regulations for A and B code machines until further notice.
Trans. 5-7-41
No. 77
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington
May 8, 1941
No Number.
From Vice Chief OHASI to Minister Wakasugi.
I want you to leave the custody of the government code in the hands of IGUCHI. No matter how long the communications are or how hurriedly the code must be used, there should be no occasion to call upon the services of telegraphic clerks. Please impress upon all of your secretaries that this is a special regulation.
In view of the importance of the details of our recent exchange of wires, please (burn?) them immediately.
Trans. 5-9-41
No. 78
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 6, 1941
No Number.
I have Counselor IGUCHI take care of the custody of the government code. Though a secretary usually handles it, when the communication is a long one or when we are in a hurry, I have on occasion asked telegraphic clerk HORIUCHI and assistant telegraphic clerks HORI and KAJIWARA to handle it.
Trans. 5-7-41
No. 79
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
9 May 1941
No Number.
To the Vice Minister [a], from Wakasugi. [b]
I respectfully acknowledge receipt of your telegram [c].
Because of various duties at this office it requires a long time for a secretary alone to handle long messages and the increased volume of traffic in connection with this matter [d].
(My message # 272 [e] required 6 men working for 6 hours.)
With the opening of negotiations, the volume of telegraphic traffic is bound to increase tremendously. As time is at a premium in handling these communications, you can well ap-
Page A-55
preciate the inadvisability of having only the secretary handle this work. Furthermore, it goes without saying that the increased traffic will interfere greatly with other duties of this office.
However, fortunately, our communication clerks have been constantly reminded of the necessity of maintaining security, and they have faithfully adhered to this policy in their work.
Although I appreciate the intent of your telegram [c] from the standpoint of security, I nevertheless request your authorization to enlist the aid of Horiuchi, Hori, and Kazuwara to handle communication duties under strict supervision.
Also please authorize me to have Kawabata of Chicago come here temporarily to assist us in our communication work. (Bring all codes and do his work in this office.)
[a] Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ohashi.
[b] Japanese Minister to Washington, under Ambassador Nomura.
[c] See I, 77, unnumbered, dated 8 May in which Tokyo issues Washington special regulations for custody of the Chief of Mission private code.
[d] Japanese-American negotiations, being conducted in great secrecy.
[e] Not available.
Trans. 12-5-41
No. 80
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo
May 13, 1941
No Number.
To Acting Vice Minister Yamamoto from Wakasugi.
I have no doubt that you are giving consideration to the matter of having additional telegraphic secretaries and telegraphic clerks. If, however, matters are allowed to go on the way they are, there is danger that we will have some sick people on our hands.
Will you please, therefore, give consideration to the contents of the last paragraph of my message [a] sent on the 9th, in which I asked for Kawasata to come to help us out. If this cannot be arranged could you have one or two persons having fair ability sent to us from one of our offices in this vicinity?
[a] See I, 103-107.
Trans. 5-16-41
No. 81
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
7 May 1941
# 273.
2 parts-complete
Regarding your # 191 [a].
I called on the Secretary of State during the morning of the 7th with regard to the "oral statement" and the neutrality pact.
The Secretary told me that he was fully aware of the sincere efforts I was making to correct and improve the relations between the two countries, and the neutrality pact.
He went on to say that the time at which the United States must act, and act speedily, was practically at hand, and it was necessary to move before it was too late. Hitlerism cannot be
Page A-56
permitted to reach all of the seven seas. The United States, with defense as the main objective, shall protect her rights and interests (every country has an equal right to do this, he added) and will resist Hitlerism to the end, even if this takes ten or twenty years. He repeated that this was necessary from the viewpoint of defense.
"All of my colleagues," he said, "urge me to act quickly." They warned him not to hesitate, or procrastinate and that immediate action is needed if he does not want to be too late.
He strongly advocated the commencement of U.S.-Japanese negotiations. I have never before heard him use so enthusiastic a tone or language as on this occasion.
(Part 2)
Regarding the Neutrality Pact, (I also referred to the possibility of he and I exchanging notes containing the gist of the "understanding pact", in the event that the neutrality pact was an impossibility) the Secretary apparently is of the attitude that it would be entirely useless for him to discuss this matter with me, if I have not been given any instructions from my government. Apparently, he has no intention of touching on this phase. (He said that he had turned this matter over to his advisors for their consideration. They unofficially state that something may be done about a neutrality pact after an "understanding" agreement is entered into. At present, however, from the viewpoint of domestic politics, it would be impossible to enter into anything resembling a neutrality pact. Moreover, since practically all of the problems between the U.S. and Japan are contained in the "understanding" agreement, they feel that its consideration should be the immediate task, the Secretary said.)
The Secretary said also that he could see some points in the "understanding" agreement which should be revised to make it applicable to the signatory nations.
If I were to express my opinion, I would say that in view of the present critical world conditions, and more particularly, in view of the present attitude of the United States, this is no longer the time for propaganda, bluffing, and feeling out each other. Looking at the whole situation from our country, I firmly believe that now is the time to give way to great statesmanship. Now is the time, I feel, for us to make a determined effort to regain good relations between the two countries.
During the conversations, he said that he knows Hitler equally as well as Mr. Matsuoka does. Then he added, "I may be wrong".
In view of the fact that this matter has been kept a deep secret heretofore, and because we have been holding conferences at various times under promises of their being "off the record", I have not handed the Oral Statement over. Please be aware of this.
Because of the various circumstances outlined above, will you please arrange to commence negotiations along the lines of the "understanding" agreement immediately.
[a] See I, 67-Text of note to be handed to Secretary Hull.
Trans. 5-7-41
PAGE A-57
No. 82
FROM: Tokyo (Japanese Foreign Minister)
TO: Washington
May 8, 1941
# 200.
Urgent.
Your message # 273 [a] was communicated to me by telephone twice today, once in the morning and in the afternoon. I made a reply by telephone. On that occasion I stated that it was my intention to make publication within four or five days at the very latest. Furthermore, on the basis of this Minister's oral statement, as I would like to submit it for the President's perusal, please make presentation of it immediately to Secretary of State HULL requesting him to, in turn, hand it over to the President.
[a] See I, 81. Nomura reports conversation with Secretary Hull during the morning of the 7th with regard to the "oral statement" and the neutrality pact.
Trans. 5-9-41
No. 84
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 May 1941
# 277.
Part 1 of 8.
Foreign Office secret.
Supplementary to my message # 273 [a].
1. Recently, especially since the passage of the National Defense Act, the real political and economic powers in the United States have practically entirely been placed in the hands of President Roosevelt. The trend towards a dictatorship is constantly becoming more and more evident and unmistakable.
Practically all of the more influential newspapers and other organs of communication are being manipulated and guided by Roosevelt. In other words, the so-called "public opinion" is an instrument which is being cleverly manufactured by the President. As evidence of this, it is apparent that neither the politicians nor the commentators and the critics of such organizations as the "America First" cannot soften or change the so-called "public opinion" manufactured by Roosevelt.
Supplementing this, all persons who protest or oppose the Rooseveltian policies, are being given a figurative death sentence by being branded traitors or spies. In other words, I am of the opinion that the freedom of expression of one's thoughts is rapidly becoming non-existent.
[a] See I, 81.
Trans. 5-12-41
Page A-58
No. 85
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 May 1941
# 277.
Part 2 of 8.
The persons who were formerly considered the brains of the Roosevelt administration have gradually been removed until of late the only ones who remain close to the President are Hopkins, Walker (for 20 years this man has supported Roosevelt and was business manager of Roosevelt's third term campaign, and is now Postmaster General), and Hull. Even these men, although they are quite influential in having the power to make suggestions, apparently do not have the final say. The decisions in practically all of the more important matters are being made by none other than the President himself.
It is now a certainty that when I made my recent proposals to the United States that only the Secretary of the Navy, besides the above mentioned three persons, was present at the conference with the President to discuss it. It is fairly definite that Stimson as well as the other Cabinet officials and the State Department officers were all left out of the conference. Hull, it is reported, announced to the Undersecretary of State and to the other higher-ups in his department, that matters pertaining to United States-Japanese relations were things that would be decided by the extreme head of the government.
While on this subject, I might mention that Roy Howard, who has been utilized by this Embassy in the past, and with whom you are on friendly terms, is at present a member of the "outs" as far as the President is concerned, since the journalist not only opposed him in the third term campaign but also opposed the National Defense Act when it was being discussed.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 36
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 May 1941
# 277.
Part 3 of 8.
The great majority of the American people, including the President, look upon this war as a battle between totalitarianism and democracy.
In general the people are convinced of the following points:
That totalitarianism is an enemy of humanitarianism since it refuses to recognize the liberty of an individual;
That though aggressions may, temporarily, seem successful, in the long run they are all doomed to failure and they give Caesar and Napoleon as examples;
That they must aid England which is a self-claimed democracy, to the bitter end;
That there is a possibility that the German-British war will develop into a German-U. S. war.
The American people are so convinced of the above points that it would be an impossibility for anyone, regardless of the amount of effort he may make, to change them. This condition is true today, and will be true in the future. It has come to such a point as to almost automatically brand one a traitor who, with the best intentions, offers even a word of warning.
Most Americans believe by wishful thinking, that this European war will develop into a long term affair and that if, during this time, the U.S. goes into aiding Britain on a large scale,
PAGE A-58
the German side (including Italy) will certainly be crushed. There are, among the American people, those such as Lindbergh who oppose the popular belief that Germany will certainly be crushed. However, I am of the opinion that only a small minority support these men.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 87
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 May 1941
# 277.
Part 4 of 8.
The United States feels that she must prevent Germany's beating England decisively, (but how this is to be done is still a mystery.) (Translator's note: slightly garbled here). Under present conditions, however, it is highly doubtful that the United States will take the initiative to mediate and thus bring about peace between England and Germany.
The United States is exceedingly interested in completing her national defense program and hence is unable to increase her material aid to Europe. While on the one hand she is determined to complete her vast armament program, she is strengthening her recently effectuated patrol system and probably in the near future the United States will put a convoy system into operation.
However, the United States must make up its mind to enter the war before it can launch a convoy program. Hence, it naturally follows that the United States will take a big stride towards entrance into the war when she establishes a convoy system.
Those advocating the United States' entrance into the war in this country have suddenly gathered much backing as reports of the poor showing of the British in the Balkans and the Near East become known. This is a condition which demands our undivided attention, I believe.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 88
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 May 1941
# 277.
Part 5 of 8.
In view of this very delicate situation that the United States finds herself in, it would be exceedingly disadvantageous to her if she must stand against both Japan and Germany at one and the same time.
In a situation like this, it can be seen why the United States would consider patching up her relations with Japan, which is, from the U.S. viewpoint, the lesser of the two dangers. The fact that the United States is desirous of beginning negotiations along the lines of the so-called "understanding agreement", at a time such as this, would seem to endorse the various reports and observations herein listed.
However, it would be erroneous to conclude that by so doing the United States was giving in to Japan. According to secret information I have been able to obtain, the United States' plans, should she have to engage both Japan and Germany are as follows: She intends to bide her time in the Pacific area, concentrating on defense, until her vast navy and air force is com-
Page A-60
pleted several years hence. With those at her command she will launch a death struggle with Japan, it is said.
With regard to the U.S. attitude toward Japan, it is as unpopular as ever. In this respect, Japan runs third only to Germany and Italy, with whom the United States people are constantly reminded, Japan is allied.
However, on the occasion of presentation of my credentials when I arrived here to assume my post, the President said to me, informally, that he was a friend of Japan. Moreover, the President and few of the persons very close to him, realize that the Japanese national traits differ from those of Germany and Italy, and also that Japan is not an aggressive nation in the sense that Germany and Italy are. The same persons started to believe, too, that it would be to the interest of the United States to bring about closer relations between the United States and Japan, (please carefully note, however, that they do not consider this an absolute necessity).
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 89
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 May 1941
# 277.
Part 6 of 8.
3. Because of the conditions outlined above, unless some action is taken right now with regard to U.S.-Japanese relations, the desire on the part of the President and others to bring about closer relations may cool off. Moreover, the United States may adopt a policy of applying vigorous economic pressure on Japan. For the sake of preserving her national life, Japan may then be forced to make armed overtures in the direction of the south, which, of course, is accompanied by the danger of a total war between Japan and the United States.
Assuming that recovery of U.S.-Japanese relations is a possibility, I was confronted with the problem of when would be the most opportune time to do so. I find that there are three possible times in which this may occur:
(a) At a time when the trend of the European war is not clearly defined.
(b) At a time when it is clear that Germany is the victor.
(c) At a time when the belligerents have lost interest in the war upon its having become a stalemate.
In the case of (a) the important thing is that both countries (Translator's note: Japan and the U.S. is no doubt implied) stand on equal terms. Of course, it may be argued that if we wait until such a time that Germany's victory cannot be questioned, there would be no chance of our standing in an unfavorable position. However, from the standpoint of Japan, it would be to her best interest to have the China Incident settled before the conclusion of the European war. If this is done, we would have freedom of action to meet the post war conditions. This would be of great help to us in promoting our national powers and we would be able to wield considerable influence in the international scene.
Although plan (b) is an exceedingly desirable one from the general viewpoint, if we have to sit in on the international scene carrying the heavy load which is the China Incident, we would be considerably handicapped. Moreover, we would not be free to promote our national powers in a manner in which we would wish. Hence, there is the danger that Japanese demands will be restrained by third powers. Finally, at this time, it is impossible for any person to say as to when the time will come when German victory will become a certainty.
Trans. 5-13-41
PAGE A-61
No. 90
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 May 1941
# 277.
Part 7 of 8.
(d) in that (though this possibility is a small one) there is a good chance that the United States will have entered the war by then and that the opportunity for revising U.S.-Japanese relations will have been lost forever.
After looking at the matter from these various angles, I have come to the conclusion that plan (a) is the best and the sooner that it is carried out the more advantageous it would be to us.
Next, the matter of the contents of the proposal to correct U.S.-Japanese relations was tackled. In doing so, first consideration was given to attainment of the goal of the Tripartite Pact and to the prevention of a U.S.-Japanese war. In doing so, it was discovered that it was first necessary to clarify our relationship with Germany; the United States' relationship with England; the problems surrounding the China Incident and the Southward program; the problems surrounding the policy of economic squeezing, etc. These matters, it became evident, would all have to be considered as inter-related problems.
With the atmosphere between the U.S. and Japan the way it is at present, there is exceedingly little hope of success of anything like a trade agreement which would touch merely one phase of the whole. At the same time, one must feel pessimistic as to the success of any settlement which is based upon philosophical or idealistic beliefs, such as, for example, our New Order in East Asia program or the plan to bring about peace and quiet throughout the world through a "New Order" program. Should we bring up any of these things, it would tend only to have our sincerity suspected.
As a matter of fact, in the process of drawing up this "understanding agreement" we strongly urged that the "New Order" be given recognition and that a proposal be made to mediate in the Great War. It is now absolutely certain that they cannot be made to accept either of these.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 91
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
7 May 1941
# 277.
Part 8 of 8.
It is natural and inevitable that the U.S. will make much use of such fundamental doctrines as the "non-recognition of territorial alterations as the result of aggression", "disapproval of warlike acts", etc. There is a great danger that such phrases will spell the doom of the attempts to revive U.S.-Japanese relations.
(In connection with the "understanding" agreement the United States has already advocated the following points:
1. Absolutely guaranteeing the territorial integrity not only of each other but also of every other state in the world, and to respect the rights of those countries.
2. To support the fundamental policy of non-intervention in domestic issues of the said countries.
3. Adherence to the basic principle of equal opportunity-including commercial-to all.
Page A-61
4. Non-alteration of the status quo in the Pacific except where changes were brought about by peaceful means.
Fearing, however, that these would give rise to lengthy discussions as to basic principles, they were held down.)
In other words, we have mutually agreed to limit the expressing of our innermost feelings concerning our views on the world, and will express even these only when it is absolutely necessary.
It is true that it would be exceedingly difficult to wipe away at one stroke the various complicated problems which have been accumulating over a period of many years. However, I firmly believe that should we once start out in the direction of an "understanding", the various complications would gradually become untangled until the point is reached where a true friendship will be born.
I further believe that should we make the present talks an actuality, we may be able to restrain the U.S. with regard to the present war, and may even be able to change her attitude entirely.
In the meantime, however, I am of the belief that we should concentrate our efforts to bringing about the agreement.
In the hopes that we will meet with success in our undertakings, I have written this report at great length.
The end.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 92
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
8 May 1941
# 279.
Secret outside the department.
Without a single question of doubt it is becoming clear that the situation here in this country is taking an ever stiffening trend, especially in view of the attitude expressed by the Secretary of State yesterday morning and the speeches of the Secretaries of War and Navy and WILKE.
I believe that this may be but the reaction to our delays with regard to the "understanding proposal" or maybe they are beginning to fear possible failure or again it may be the course of action decided upon by the Cabinet which met today. If that be the case, all our efforts to date will come to naught. These are the authoritative intelligences that have come to me.
As for myself, I believe that the time is ripe for bringing about an understanding.
Translator's Note: The last paragraph of the text was not clear, but in the light of the context and the ungarbled portions, it is felt that this is reasonably accurate.
Trans. 5-9-41
Page A-63
No. 93
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 8, 1941
# 280.
To the Chief of the Telegraphic Bureau from WAKASUGI.
The situation in the United States is momentarily becoming more pressing and as the number of urgent messages from Japan is great and call for immediate decision, do not waste a moment's time. Please arrange to have this submitted to His Excellency for his perusal.
Trans. 5-9-41
No. 94
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 8, 1941
# 282.
Secret outside the department.
As I have told you in my successive communications, the situation in this country is momentarily becoming more pressing. Though I do not know whether or not you intend on the one hand to start negotiations along the lines of our "understanding proposal", should you decide to commence negotiations they should be undertaken without the slightest delay. Therefore, please wire your instructions (details could follow in a later message) at the very latest by the 9th (Japanese or American time?).
Trans. 5-9-41
No. 95
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 10, 1941
# 290.
The certain influential Cabinet member told me confidentially as follows:
"Though arguments for actuating the convoy system within American Government circles is extremely strong; the President, considering Japan-American relations, seems to have been able to control it to date. In view of the increasing clamor of those demanding convoys, in day before yesterday's, the 8th, Cabinet meeting the President too seemed to be on the verge of following the trend. In his foreign policy speech on the 14th of this month, he is scheduled to refer to it. However, should Japan-American negotiations be started by that date, he plans to change even the details of that speech. In the event that negotiations are not undertaken, Japan-American conversations will end in absolute failure."
Trans. 5-14-41
Page A-64
No. 96
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 8, 1941
# 281.
Part 1 of 2 [a].
In the ever tightening situation in the United States, as you noted in your wire, yesterday the 7th, urgent questions were put to me. Since the next few days here will bear close watching, I began making preparatory plans for ameliorating the situation through a certain influential Cabinet member upon whom I called late last night. This afternoon I contacted the said influential Cabinet member and the purport of our private conversations is as follows:
1. "On the morning of the 8th when I talked with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of State made the following confidential statements to me:
a. 'I am fully appreciative of Ambassador NOMURA's efforts and persistence for the maintenance of peace in view of current developments in the situation and in this I have not changed the slightest. Please transmit this to His Excellency.'
b. 'The key to an early settlement of this matter lies only in the hand of the Foreign Minister. I am well aware that as much as the Ambassador would like to do, this is a question which he cannot settle to his own liking.'
c. 'To date we have made some progress in spite of some changes and revisions, but as for continuing talks so soon after the Ambassador's instructions have been received from his home Government with regard to the oral statement and, at this late date, to be forced to make additional changes, makes us wonder what Japan's true intention can be.'
d. 'Whether it is incorrect communication of rumor that the Foreign Minister suggested in his speech that the President should come to Japan himself to learn the true situation, etc., I do not know; but this cannot be regarded but as the bait by means of which the Cabinet's anti-Japanese opinions have stiffened (it seemed as though he were referring to STIMSON and KNOX).'
e. 'Judging from such intelligences as are available to us, we cannot help but feel that possibly the Foreign Minister stands in rather an embarrassing position as far as the German authorities are concerned.' ".
[a] See I, 97.
Trans. 5-10-41
No. 97
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 8, 1941
# 281.
Part 2 of 2 [a].
2. The certain Cabinet member asked HULL: "In spite of the outcome of today's urgently called secret Cabinet meeting, how would it be to give them a little more time for study?" HULL replied: "Should there be any hope of some kind of an answer during the interval that, too, would become but one proposal; but because of the attitude which exists in the Cabinet on this question, it would be hard for me to give any assurances at this time."
3. When I asked him with regard to the subject under discussion in today's extraordinary and secret Cabinet meeting, the certain Cabinet member merely replied that it would be only possible to imagine what it was in the light of his press conference (but I interpret this to
Page A-64
be a hint that the subject under discussion was the convoy question). However, it would seem that during the coming week the President will make some kind of declaration; but when I asked whether or not he would include in his declaration his considerations of this draft, he merely glowered at me fixedly.
[a] Part 1, See I, 96.
Trans. 5-10-41
No. 98
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Nomura)
9 May 1941
# 201.
Regarding your # 277 [a], 279 [b], 281 [c], 282 [d].
I fully appreciate the situation that you are confronted with. I am also aware of the reasons that you are in such a rush. Moreover, it goes without saying that I feel very much the same way as you do about this matter.
As I said in our telephone conversation yesterday [e], we have other things to take into careful consideration, such as our relations with our allies, relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, the general situation in the Far East, as well as various domestic conditions. For these reasons it is impossible for us at this end to act with the speed which you desire. I feel confident that you can appreciate this fact.
As I said over the telephone yesterday [e], I would like to come to some decision during today, the 9th. With this in mind, I am doing everything possible. However, there is a certain reason why this decision may be (one?) day delayed.
Please bear this in mind.
[a] See I, 84-91.
[b] See I, 92, dated 8 May. Nomura emphatically reports that the speeches of Knox, Stimson, and Wilkie indicate a trend which will make action impossible unless taken at once.
[c] See I, 96, 97.
[d] See I, 94, dated 8 May, in which Nomura tells Matsuoka instructions must be sent by the 9th, as situation is pressing.
[e] Ambassador Nomura called Foreign Minister Matsuoka on the Trans-Pacific telephone on 8 May 1941 from 0110 to 0116 (zone plus 5 time), (1510 to 1516, zone minus nine time) (Tokyo), 8 May.
Trans. 5-9-41
No. 99
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Nomura)
9 May 1941
# 202.
4 parts, complete.
(Part 1)
Regarding my # 201 [a].
If you believe that it is necessary, please advise the Secretary of State confidentially along the following lines in addition to that I have previously given you:
Page A-66
1. It is this Minister's greatest desire to see United States-Japanese relations relieved of their present strain. I am most anxious to see the United States discontinue its policy of aiding Chiang Kai-Shek, and also to have the United States urge peace between China and Japan.
That there is no doubt as to this Minister's sincerity with regards to the above, should be clearly seen upon taking into consideration my (recent actions?).
2. In its over-anxiousness to aid England, the United States is forcing Germany to assume that in actuality the United States is more interested in attacking Germany.
Please point out to the United States that the continuance of this policy on their part will force us to take enemy-like actions against the United States. This Minister desires, above everything else, to prevent animosity. I plead to the United States-nay, the (entire world?)-that the United States withhold any move which will force us to become her enemy.
I am convinced that the President and the Secretary of State are well aware of the above-my most cherished hopes-because they are acquainted with the things I have done.
(Part 2)
3. Should matters progress without being checked, Japan will be forced to live up to her obligations under the Japan-Germany-Italy Tripartite Pact. It has already been made clear that Japan has every intention of living up to her promises.
4. An "Understanding" agreement, in spite of all the bolstering that it could be given, would disappear like pricked bubbles, if matters are allowed to develop to the extent mentioned above.
Both parties must make an effort to control matters now. It is because this Minister does not want to see any further unfavorable development, that he clearly stated Japan's standpoint [c] before any negotiations were begun.
5. The "Oral Statement" [c] which I sent to you earlier, should have been sent to you as soon as I returned, on 22 April [b]. However, I had to give other matters, including the Japan-Soviet Union neutrality pact, my attention, and on top of that I became ill with my usual sickness.
As a habit of mine, I like to handle these matters myself and do not leave them for my subordinates to handle.
(Part 3)
In other words, I merely jotted down the things I saw, and heard, and the things that impressed me most deeply while on my visit to Europe. I did this at the first opportunity I had upon returning to my desk after recovering from my illness, and had absolutely no ulterior motive in doing so.
I picked out those parts of the notes which I thought would be of interest to the President and the Secretary of State. Had I known that they had first hand knowledge, I would have realized that my statements were superfluous.
It was only my interest in promoting world peace that motivated me to dispatch the "Oral Statement"; there was absolutely no other reason for doing so. The other parties may think that I was being unnecessarily meddlesome. However, there is such a proverb as, "You can't know too much." (?) and I thought that the impressions I got, and the first hand observations I made may have been of some value as reference material.
6. As you are aware, there were certain quarters in the United States which desired me to visit the U.S. Moreover, rumors of such a trip were reported in the press. This aroused considerable suspicion in our country, as well as in Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union. Therefore, I definitely denied harboring such intentions when I was questioned by newspapermen. However, there was a newspaperman who further said that there were those who thought that there was a need for me to go to the United States in order to become better acquainted with it. I thought that I was fairly well acquainted with the United States and saw no reason for going there for that purpose.
PAGE A-67
(Part 4)
Then he asked, how would it be to have the President and the Secretary of State come to visit Japan so that they may become better acquainted with conditions in Japan:
To this, I replied that probably it would be undiplomatic to urge the President and Secretary of State, who no doubt are exceedingly busy, to come for a visit at this time. However, I added, if they would consider it, it would be very nice.
You should realize that there was no reason for me to bring up such a subject at the time. Moreover, you should have no doubt, after reading the reports, that the facts had been twisted.
Translator's note: this sentence somewhat illegible; translation only approximate.
The mere fact, however, that the United States takes an exceedingly antagonistic attitude, even over such a minor incident as that, would seem to prove that the United States is out to give a twist to everything. Of course, it is natural that there should be some minor arguments. However, it is equally natural that we become highly on edge when they quibble about every little thing. (You need not go out of your way to bring the contents of this paragraph to the Secretary's attention. However, if the conversation runs along a line wherein you could conveniently insert it, it may be used to advantage.)
7. The rumors that I, as Minister, am experiencing considerable difficulty because of having taken a stand on the side of Germany are entirely without basis of truth. I have in no way suffered from taking the stand that I have.
[a] See I, 98.
[b] The date Matsuoka arrived in Tokyo from his European trip.
[c] See I, 67(Tok-Wash # 191 of 3 May) for text of this "Oral Statement".
Trans. 5-9-41
No. 100
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo
9 May 1941
# 285.
I can appreciate your feeling of anxiety concerning the effect upon the Tripartite Alliance, which an adjustment of relations between Japan and the United States might have, but from the standpoint of the larger aspects of the situation I believe such adjustment would not in the least be to the disadvantage of Germany and Italy. Recently in talking to the President I told him of the influence Japan and the United States could wield in cooperating together for world peace. (The Secretary of State was present at the time.)
It was with the same idea that I told Mr. Hull that peace in the Pacific would be the first step toward later peace in Europe. At another time when I expressed the same thought to a certain Cabinet member, he replied that he would place his "hopes" on this (he is a Catholic believer), and this idea might well become the occasion for endeavors that would lead to a bettering of Japanese-American relations, which I think would also be profitable from the standpoint of the Tripartite Alliance.
Trans. 5-12-41 http://Louis-J-Sheehan.biz
Page A-68
No. 101
FROM: Washington
TO: Tokyo
9 May 1941
The items in your # 202 [a] are all well understood from the facts that you have already reported. Since yesterday morning, the 8th, I have been trying in every way, mainly along the lines of your message, to clear up their misunderstandings, and have endeavored to push along our conversations on these same lines. Therefore, I wish you would consider past happenings as having been settled for the present, and make your attitude clear so that we can go ahead with these conversations.
[a] See I, 99.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 102
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
9 May 1941
# 204.
Re my # 201 [a].
Our opinion regarding the revision is given in separate telegram # 205 [b] and our reasons for the revision are given in separate telegram # 206 [c]. Please begin negotiations at once for the above-mentioned revision.
[a] See I, 98.
[b] See I, 103-107.
[c] Not used.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 103
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
9 May 1941
# 205.
Part 3 of 7, Parts 1 and 2 missing.
... (continued from Part 2) ... alluding to the important questions that have made this understanding difficult, both countries should be convinced as to which problems could suitably and profitably be made the subjects of discussion in the conference, and those which it would not be profitable to consider would not be included. We recognize that the relations between the two governments could be improved in a marked way if the situation as to the following point could be made clear, or improved.
(1) The international and national concepts held by the two countries, Japan and America.
(2) The attitude of both governments to the European war.
(3) The relations of both governments to the China incident. (The above are the same as in your # 234 [a].)
(4) Trade between the two countries.
[a] See I, 46.
Trans. 5-12-41
Page A-69
No. 104
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
9 May 1941
# 205.
Part 4 of 7, Parts 1 and 2 missing.
(5) Economic activities of both countries in the Southwestern Pacific areas.
(6) The policies of both governments in regard to the political stability of the Pacific.
With the aforementioned articles we take up consideration of these points:
(1) International and national concepts held by Japan and the United States:
We recognize that both Japan and the United States are independent nations on a mutually equal footing. If both governments desire the establishment of lasting peace, and a new era based upon the confidence and cooperation of both countries in their mutual relations, they will make it clear that both countries are agreed in their national ----- and both governments will adopt the policy of equality for all nations and all races.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 105
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
9 May 1941
# 205.
Part 5 of 7, (Parts 1 and 2 missing).
Both governments will preserve respectively the national concepts based upon their distinctive traditions, and those moral principles which are the basis for social and national life, and will resist with firm determination any foreign ideas which are contrary to the same.
(2) The attitudes of both governments toward the European war:
With a view to bringing about world peace the governments of Japan and the United States will cooperate in trying to prevent the spread of the war in Europe, and to bring about the restoration of peace as soon as possible.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 106
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
9 May 1941
# 205.
Part 6 of 7, (Parts 1 and 2 missing). [a]
(3) The relations of both countries to the China incident.
The United States government will recognize the three principles enunciated by Premier Konoye, the treaty based upon the same that has been concluded with the Nanking government, and the principles brought out in the joint statement made by Japan, Manchukuo, and China; and, trusting in the good neighbor policy of the Japanese government, will advise the Chiang regime to make peace.
(4) Trade between the two countries.
When this understanding shall have been reached and duly agreed upon by the governments of both countries, each shall give assurance to the other to supply each with goods desired by the other, respectively, whenever it is possible to do so. At the same time, ways
Page A-70
and means will be considered by each to bring back the trading conditions which formerly existed while the Japan-U. S. Commercial Treaty was in effect.
(5) Economic Activities of both countries in the southwest Pacific area.
Since it is stipulated and agreed upon that Japanese expansion into the southwestern Pacific is to be a peaceful one, the United States will cooperate with Japan in the development and/or securing by Japanese of materials such as petroleum, rubber, tin, nickel, etc., from this area.
[c] Revised translation of message sent on 5-12-41.
Trans. 5-14-41
No. 107
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
9 May 1941
# 205.
Part 7 of 7, (Parts 1 and 2 missing).
(6) Policies of both countries in regard to the political stability of the Pacific:
(a) The governments of Japan and the United States shall cause the Philippine Islands to maintain permanent neutrality, and shall jointly guarantee the independence of the islands on condition that no discrimination be made against Japanese subjects.
(b) The United States will give friendly consideration to Japanese immigrants, making no discrimination between them and the subjects of other nations.
The articles of this understanding shall be communicated by secret memoranda between the two governments, and they shall be made public to the extent, in the manner, and at the time, agreed upon by the two governments.
Trans. 5-12-41
No. 108
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 10, 1941
# 289.
I have heard confidentially a statement to the effect that a decision will be reached within one or two days. Secretary of State HULL, I understand, is waiting impatiently for an answer (I have it confidentially that he will wait until late the night of today, the 10th). As it will be impossible to delay any longer than that, I wonder whether any further extension of the time will make the ultimate moment come too late? Should we fail to take this opportunity, I understand that it is their opinion that these conversations will result in failure. I greatly fear that this most favorable opportunity for adjusting the diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States may slip through our hands and I am greatly worried.
Whether or not we open negotiations along the lines of my # 273 [a], though you have in successive messages outlined your decisions, in view of the critical nature of the situation, please let me have the best plan under the present conditions.
[a] See I, 81. Nomura reports conversation with Secretary Hull during the morning of the 7th with regard to the "oral statement" and the neutrality pact.
Trans. 5-14-41
Page A-71
No. 109
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 12, 1941
# 292.
Part 1 of 2. [a]
Yesterday, the 11th, at 10:00 p.m. (noon on the 12th Japan time), when I talked with the Secretary of State he said:
"As we are now conducting talks and negotiations, I have been exercising a great deal of secrecy in regard to them and have absolutely made no reference to them in my press conferences. Knowing Your Excellency's discreetness and astuteness you likewise, I am sure, are carefully guarding its secrecy." With this statement he received my memorandum.
I replied: "I am well aware of this. My one mission is the question of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Aside from that I have no other purpose."
The Secretary said: "I, too have been on the point of retiring from public life but in view of the threat of war I have remained in office. Neither one of us are diplomats in the professional sense." And later he said; "When I asked you not to transmit this to Japan, it was because its disclosure would have a great effect upon the domestic tranquility of the United States." Then again he told me very confidentially that a great deal of time would be required in order to rest equanimity. Again he went on to say: "In view of the way in which the Japanese Government handles diplomatic questions, though they come under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Minister, War and Navy Ministers too are able to bring great pressure to bear. In addition to which, the Premier exerts much control."
[a] See I, 111, for Part 2.
Trans. 5-14-41
No. 110
FROM: Tokyo
TO: Washington
11 May 1941
# 209.
Strictly secret.
It goes without saying that this matter should be handled in absolute secrecy and we have been exercising extreme caution in this regard. It is absolutely forbidden to discuss this matter with the members of your office staff except those directly concerned, not to mention the Financial Attaché in New York (?). Rumor of this matter has reached our financial circles from New York and a certain amount of information has reached Germany from America. Therefore, please be increasingly careful regarding maintaining secrecy.
Trans. 5-12-41
Page A-72
No. 111
FROM: Washington (Nomura)
TO: Tokyo
May 12, 1941
# 292.
Part 2 of 2. [a]
When I told him the reasons for our revisions, in view of the fact that he questioned me with regard to the evacuation of China, I told him that we plan to evacuate all in accordance with our commitments with the exception of those troops stationed in North China and Inner Mongolia who are there to suppress Communism. The Secretary of State then asked: "Should the China incident be concluded, will not Japan with these troops carry out her Southward movement?" I replied: "Our true intent is peaceful Southward penetration."
The Secretary of State said: "For us to wait until Hitlerism has penetrated to our borders before attempting to block it, would be disastrous. Therefore, it is necessary that we forestall it so that it will not approach us." (Since this is an argument which we must guard against, I intend to develop plans to check it.)
In our conversations we said that should the European war become a long one, the whole of our materialistic civilization will be destroyed. Our peoples will not be able to escape exhaustion and the only real victor will be Bolshevism. In referring to the extension of the war in the Pacific, we agreed that the war psychology of both countries would have to be diverted into more peaceful channels. It is clear that the United States does not desire an imbroglio with Japan and, at the same time, she is not at all anxious to become embroiled in a conflict with HITLER.
Our conversation lasted for forty minutes, and, promising to meet again, we parted.
I am most humbly indebted to Your Excellency for your untiring efforts. I am just now beginning to see a slight ray of hope and I am taking heart.
[a] See I, 109, for Part 1 reporting Nomura's talk with Secretary of State Hull on the 11th.
Trans. 5-16-41
PAGE A-73
B-JAPANESE DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
No. 112
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
December 10, 1940
# 591.
With the appointment of Ambassador Nomura we wish to formulate a definite plan for our propaganda and information gathering work by seeking cooperation of Japanese bank and business officials in the U.S.
(Abstract-some values missing.)
Trans. 1-25-41
No. 113
FROM: New York (Iguchi)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
December 17, 1940
# 763.
(2 parts-completed.)
Re your msg. to Wash. # 591 [a].
As propaganda and enlightenment organs here, we have the Japan Institute, the Tourist Bureau, and the silk office of the Ministry of Commerce and Communication. Other groups whose importance we cannot ignore for collecting information are the financial adviser, the Army and Navy Inspection Offices, Representatives of Domei, ASAHI, NITINITI, AND YOMIURI, the Bank of Japan, the Specie Bank, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, N.Y.K., O.S.K., the Manchurian R.R. and OKURA Co.
In order to obtain the fullest cooperation from the above it is well to establish an information committee centering around the press attaché.
[a] See I, No. 112.
Trans. 1-9-41
No. 114
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
February 5, 1941
# 056.
In connection with New York to Tokyo message # 763, [b] the business men (including Sumitomo's representatives) and representatives of newspapers were invited to call there. One of my men discussed the following points with them:
(1) To have the various representatives of business firms engage in collecting intelligence material.
(2) To have all such representatives abroad (in the United States) cable their opinions and manipulations in so far as they are related to politics, through diplomatic channels so as to maintain secrecy.
We were able to obtain their agreement to cooperate with us in this respect, so please proceed with this program.
Page A-74
We have the perfect understanding and agreement of the Army and Navy in this connection. They promise to give us whatever aid they can.
[a] See I, 112. "With the appointment of Ambassador Nomura we wish to formulate a definite plan for our propaganda and information gathering work by seeking cooperation of Japanese bank and business officials in the U.S."
[b] Refers to above message and lists 18 Japanese organs in New York as potential sources of information.
Trans. 2-11-41
No. 115
FROM: New York (Iguchi)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
December 11, 1940
# 762.
(3 parts-complete).
(Secret)
1. In view of the fact that our Embassy's propaganda effort in the U.S. has been chiefly confined to cultural enlightenment in the past, which by the very nature of the thing evoked little or no objection, we have been considering a plan since last year to strengthen our political propaganda methods. However, due to the increased vigilance and control exercised over foreign propaganda in general and over the 5th column activities in particular, since the outbreak of the European war, we cannot hope for too great a success in this field of propaganda. Nevertheless, the effect of the recently-signed tri-partite agreement will impose a greater necessity for just such propaganda efforts if the present Japanese-American relations are to be maintained. It is imperative, therefore, that we reconsider our efforts with a view to seeking more effective propaganda methods. While I realize that your office has been giving much thought to this question, I wish to submit herewith my views on this matter.
While cultural propaganda and enlightenment, no doubt, contribute much toward the promotion of amicable relations between Japan and America, the cost is prohibitive. Therefore, I suggest that, wherever possible, this type of propaganda be discontinued.
Political propaganda will meet with a great deal of obstacles which will cast some doubts on its successful outcome. However, we should strive to deal with fundamental problems in order to thwart the counter-propaganda in this country, which is based on the assumption that all foreign propaganda seek to divide the American people.
The set-up of the press attaché should be concentrated on the task of assembling information and of widening the intelligence net and its personnel. Especial effort should be made to establish personal contacts with the members of the press and persons influential in American politics and business. The intelligence net should be so organized as to be able to function, even if there should be a severance of diplomatic and commercial relations between Japan and the U.S.
2. In addition to the present work of investigating the activities of the American Communist party and of the Chinese by our Embassy, we should constantly keep watch over American politics and the economic and social activities of Soviet Russia in the United States, particularly as they affect Central and South Americas. For this task it is necessary not only to hire Americans, but also to have competent researchers sent from Japan.
3. Although the Tourist Bureau and the Trade Promotion Bureau have been carrying on propaganda in the past, we should consider the inconsistency of having the Tourist Bureau giving out travel information when, today, no American tourists are permitted to travel in Japan.
Trans. 1-23-41
Page A-75
No. 116
FROM: Mexico (Miura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
January 28, 1941
# 037.
(In 2 parts-complete.)
(Strictly confidential)
1. In view of the present world conditions, particularly where U.S. activities are concerned, close contact should be maintained not only from the various offices in Central and South America to Tokyo and Washington, but among themselves as well. Through such means, all officials in the field should strive to use their knowledge and abilities to the fullest extent.
2. Where it is impossible due to lack of personnel or technical abilities, to make sufficient surveys, Washington or Tokyo should keep them informed by relaying the latest information and opinions gathered from the various other sources at regular intervals, say, weekly or biweekly. In this way we should keep our heads up to date.
3. Washington and New York should keep close tab on all activities by the U.S. in that area where they involve the Latin American countries and concern us indirectly. Whatever information picked up by them should be relayed without delay to our various offices in the Latin American countries. If nothing else, copies of all cables sent from New York and Washington to Tokyo concerning this matter should be sent to the offices in Latin America.
4. Tokyo should give sincere consideration to all reports and opinions submitted from Washington and the Latin American countries and, after studying the matter carefully, dispatch whatever instructions are deemed necessary.
5. Heretofore, personnel and financial allotments allowed the Latin American offices were equivalent to those of third and fourth rate countries. The Foreign Office should give this matter their serious consideration, and if necessary dispatch an investigation party. If circumstances seem to warrant it, personnel and allowances should be increased.
Trans. 2-5-41
No. 117
FROM: Buenos Aires (Omori)
TO: Mexico City (Koshi)
February 5, 1941
# 014.
(Circular)
Received from Tokyo as # 018.
Tokyo to Lima (?) # 010.
Re my (Tokyo ?) message to Santiago (?) # 007 [a].
It is desired that projects of this type be carried out in your country too. It is possible to do so, and if it is, is it advisable? Please discuss the matter with the more prominent Japanese merchants in that area and advise.
[a] Not available.
Trans. 2-20-41
Page A-76
No. 118
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
January 30, 1941
# 043.
Foreign Office secret.
Heretofore, we have placed emphasis on publicity and propaganda work in the United States. In view of the critical situation in the recent relations between the two countries, and for the purpose of being prepared for the worst, we have decided to alter this policy. Taking into consideration the small amount of funds we have at our disposal, we have decided to de-emphasize propaganda for the time being, and instead, to strengthen our intelligence work.
Though we must give the matter of intelligence work our further study-in this connection we are at present conferring with the intelligence bureau-we have mapped out a fundamental program, the outline of which is contained in my supplementary cable No. 44 [a].
Please, therefore, reorganize your intelligence set-up and put this new program into effect as soon as possible.
Cable copies of this message, as "Minister's orders" to Canada, Mexico, (a copy to be relayed from Mexico to Mexicali), San Francisco, (copies from San Francisco to Honolulu, Los Angeles, Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver), New York, New Orleans, and Chicago.
[a] See I, 119.
Trans. 2-7-41
No. 119
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Washington (Koshi)
January 30, 1941
# 44.
(In two parts-complete).
(Foreign Office secret).
(1) Establish an intelligence organ in the Embassy which will maintain liaison with private and semi-official intelligence organs (see my message to Washington # 591 [a] and # 732 [b] from New York to Tokyo, both of last year's series).
With regard to this, we are holding discussions with the various circles involved at the present time.
(2) The focal point of our investigations shall be the determination of the total strength of the U.S. Our investigations shall be divided into three general classifications: political, economic, and military, and definite course of action shall be mapped out.
(3) Make a survey of all persons or organizations which either openly or secretly oppose participation in the war.
(4) Make investigations of all anti-Semitism, communism, movements of Negroes, and labor movements.
(5) Utilization of U.S. citizens of foreign extraction (other than Japanese), aliens (other than Japanese), communists, Negroes, labor union members, and anti-Semites, in carrying out the investigations described in the preceding paragraph would undoubtedly bear the best results.
These men, moreover, should have access to governmental establishments, (laboratories?), governmental organizations of various characters, factories, and transportation facilities.
PAGE A-77
(6) Utilization of our "Second Generations" and our resident nationals. (In view of the fact that if there is any slip in this phase, our people in the U.S. will be subjected to considerable persecution, and the utmost caution must be exercised).
(7) In the event of U.S. participation in the war, our intelligence set-up will be moved to Mexico, making that country the nerve center of our intelligence net. Therefore, will you bear in mind and in anticipation of such an eventuality, set up facilities for a U.S.-Mexico international intelligence route. This net which will cover Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru will also be centered in Mexico.
(8) We shall cooperate with the German and Italian intelligence organs in the U.S. This phase has been discussed with the Germans and Italians in Tokyo, and it has been approved.
Please get the details from Secretary Terasaki upon his assuming his duties there.http://Louis-J-Sheehan.biz
Please send copies to those offices which were on the distribution list of No. 43 [c].
[a] See I, 112.
[b] Has no bearing on this subject. # 732 probably an error.
[c] (See No. 4)-See I, 118.
Trans. 2-7-41
No. 120
FROM: New York (Morishima)
TO: Tokyo
February 26, 1941
# 60.
The situation is very strained and we have to review our Embassy's intelligence and propaganda work. On this subject last year I sent you my # 762 [a]. You in return sent # 43 [b] and # 44 [c] in the form of instructions to Washington. I am endeavoring to strengthen and further revise my work here in New York and in order to achieve liaison and cooperation, I consider it necessary to have Consul FUKUSHIMA, who has been doing this kind of work all along and who knows his business, make a trip to New York before going back to Japan. Therefore, I want you to be sure to approve of this.
Relayed to Los Angeles.
[a] New York discusses plan to strengthen the Japanese political propaganda methods in the United States for 1941.
[b]Tokyo directs Washington to reorganize their intelligence set-up and put into effect the new program which will de-emphasize propaganda and strengthen intelligence work. See I, 118.
[c] Outline of major points in connection with setting up of intelligence organization in the United States. See I, 119.
Trans. 3-6-41
No. 121
FROM: Mexico (Miura)
TO: Tokyo
February 14, 1941
# 16.
Some recent messages have been badly garbled. I suspect that American companies may be purposely garbling the texts.
Trans. 2-18-41
Page A-78
No. 122
FROM: Tokyo (Matsuoka)
TO: Mexico City (Koshi)
January 31, 1941
# 020.
So that we may better know how to manage our telegraphic work without interruption in the event that the U.S. becomes involved in the war, will you please advise us of the financial background of the telegraph companies in the country to which you are accredited, with particular notes as to their relations with the Mexican government and the U.S.
Secret.
Trans. 2-6-41
No. 123
FROM: Mexico City (Miura)
TO: Tokyo (Gaimudaijin)
January 25, 1941
# 031.
Action Washington as # 004.
(Strictly confidential).
In exchange for recognizing the Camacho regime, a number of agreements were entered into between the U.S. and Mexico. These agreements which were mainly of a military nature, were signed on November 14th.
Recently, our military attaché was able to secure a copy of these agreements, under cover of strict secrecy. The copy has been transmitted to Japan in the army code. Please be advised of its contents through the army.
Trans. 1-31-41
No. 124
FROM: Santiago (Kawasaki)
TO: Tokyo
February 4, 1941
# 19.
Re your message to Mexico # 20 [a].
See my # 77 [b] of last year.
Transradio is a German company. Because of the European war, this country's dependence upon the United States has increased, and because of the various policies of the United States which have lately become active, relations between the two countries are becoming more intimate. Even the Socialist Party, which was traditionally anti-American, has about-faced. Therefore, I fear that when the United States enters the war, this country will necessarily have to take the position of a non-belligerent.
[a] See I, 122.
[b] Not available.
Trans. 2-17-41
PAGE A-79
No. 125
FROM: Bogotá (Watanabe)
TO: Tokyo
February 6, 1941
# 3.
Re your # 20 [a] addressed to our Embassy (?) in Mexico.
1. There are two telegraph companies in this country, the All-America (an American Company), and the Marconi (an English company). In case the United States joins the war, we have no way but to make use of the government wireless station in this country. However, the sending apparatus used in this country is sufficient only for communicating to neighboring countries. Messages for distant countries are sent through the neighboring countries, those for Japan being sent via Panama.
2. Even if the United States joins the war, this country because of its domestic political situation, may be expected to remain neutral. According to what the Spanish Minister here told me, if the present government of this country joins the war, there will be an (uprising ?) in this country.
3. As an experiment, I have sent this message via the aforementioned station and so if you find anything irregular about -----, please reply by wire.
[a] See I, 122.
Trans. 2-25-41 Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire
Saturday, January 10, 2009
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